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DENIAL OF JURY TRIALS FOR EMPLOYEES WITH
DISABILITIES: THE HIGH BAR OF PROVING
DISCRIMINATORY INTENT
Stacy Hickox* & Maya Stevelinck**
Employees with disabilities face stigma and stereotypes associated
Revelation of a disability to obtain an
with their impairment.1
accommodation can lead to negative consequences including harassment,
retaliation, or even discharge, as documented by a survey of employees
who requested accommodations at a university. 2 This paper explores how
difficult it is for employees facing such negative consequences to prove
discriminatory intent under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(hereinafter "ADA"). 3 An extensive review of court decisions reveals that
the ADA's protection against discrimination rarely provides relief to
employees who suffer those negative consequences because the courts
defer to employers' reasons for adverse actions taken against people with
proof of intentional
disabilities, and discount circumstantial
stigmatization and stereotyping. 4
INTRODUCTION

Employment discrimination based on immutable characteristics has
been deemed unfair, both because it is morally wrong5 and because those
immutable traits lack a relationship with the person's value as an

* Associate Professor, Michigan State University, School of Human Resources & Labor

Relations
** Undergraduate Student, Michigan State University, School of Human Resources & Labor
Relations
1. See Debbie N. Kaminer, Mentally Ill Employees in the Workplace: Does the ADA
Amendments Act ProvideAdequate Protection?,26 HEALTH MATRIX 205, 207, 215-20 (2016).
2. F. Munir et al., Dealing with Self-Management of Chronic Illness at Work: Predictorsfor.

Self-Disclosure, 60 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1397, 1398 (2005).
3. See Kaminer, supranote 1, at 253.
4. See id. at 252 ("Mentally ill employees also do not consistently fare well under the "adverse
action" or third prong of the prima facie case.").
5. Deborah Hellman, Discrimination:When Is It Morally Wrong and Why, 4 DARTMOUTH L.

J. 3, 5 (2006).
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employee. 6 These principles apply to people with disabilities as much as
other groups of people protected by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 7
Workplace biases continue to be structural, relational, and situational, and
may often be based on cognitive or unconscious biases. 8 Such biases can
be addressed by redesigning employers' systems of decision-making,
work assignment, and conflict resolution, to influence subjective
decisions that could be affected by those biases. 9
The passage of the ADA recognized that people with disabilities face
those biases that continue to prevent their entry or retention in the
workforce, while they often need to reveal their disability to obtain an
accommodation they need to be productive. 10 Therefore, it is important
to understand how difficult it is for a person with a disability who is
adversely affected by those biases to prove a claim of disparate treatment
or retaliation.11
Accountability is an important part of any system designed to address
identified and uncorrected problems. 12 Unfortunately, for an employee
whose disability becomes known or who must reveal her disability to be
accommodated, her employer is rarely held accountable for its negative
reaction to that revelation because it is so difficult to prove that
This lack of accountability
employer's discriminatory intent. 13
contributes directly to employees' reluctance to request accommodations
provided under the ADA which could make them better performers,
reduce the burdens associated with their disability, and ultimately support
their continued employment. 14
This paper begins with a discussion of the biases which can influence
employers' decisions about people with disabilities. 15 Discrimination
6. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don't Stop Discrimination, 8 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y
22, 26 (1991) (describing various irrational assumptions underlying discrimination); Larry Alexander,
What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141

UNIV. PA. L. REV. 149, 169-70 (1992) (discussing irrationality and false beliefs).
7.
8.

Kaminer, supra note 1, at 208-09.
Susan Sturm, Second GenerationEmployment Discrimination: A StructuralApproach, 101

COLUM. L. REv. 458, 460 (2001).
9. Id. at 463, 489.
10. See Mirella Sarah De Lorenzo, Employee Mental Illness: Moving Towards a Dominant
Discourse in Management and HRM, 9 INT'L J. OF BUS. & MGMT. 133, 134 (2014).
11. See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Disabling ADA Retaliation Claims, 19 NEv. L. J. 823, 846

(2019).
12.
13.

Sturm, supranote 8, at 483.
See Porter, supra note 11, at 847-48 (citing an example of a CEO's statement, "life would

be easier [without] this distraction," and a court holding this was insufficient to establish causation or
pretext).
14. See De Lorenzo, supra note 10, at 133, 137.
15. See Kaminer, supra note 1, at 207, 215-20.
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results in a loss of opportunities for success in the workplace among
people subjected to it. 16 For employers, discrimination can increase
employee turnover17 and forfeits the positive results of a more diverse
workforce.1 8 To address these biases, the ADA proposes to "assure
equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and
economic self-sufficiency" for people with disabilities. 19
More than sixty-one million adult Americans, or at least one in four,
suffer from some type of disability. 20 This prevalence is significantly
higher for Blacks and Hispanics over age forty-five and among those in
the lowest poverty level. 2 1 Among young adults, cognitive disability
(10.6%) has been the most prevalent type, 22 while in 2019 a total of 51.5
million Americans, or 20.6% of adults aged eighteen or older, were
estimated to have some mental illness, with many also suffering from coAlong with a variety of physical
occurring substance abuse. 23
impairments, some visible and some not, these disabilities often lead to
inequities and unfairness in hiring practices and their work
environments. 24 Research on the stigmatization of people with disabilities
and an original survey of employees at a large university who requested

16.

See De Lorenzo, supra note 10, at 134; Kaminer, supra note 1, at 215; Munir, supra note

2, at 1398; Carolyn

S.

Dewa et al., Nature and Amplitude of Mental Illness in the Workplace, 5

HEALTHCARE PAPERS 12, 18 (2004).
17. See, e.g., Robert J. Flanagan, Discrimination Theory, Labor Turnover, and Racial
Unemployment Differentials, 13 J. HUM. RES. 187, 205 (1978) (showing discrimination increases
turnover).
18. See, e.g., Craig Westergard, Haply a Minority's Voice May Do Some Good: Diversity at the
Supreme Court, 29 J. JUD. ADMIN. 174, 184 (2020) (stating that diverse teams are more effective and
more effective teams lead to greater economic efficiency and ultimately social equality).
19. About the ADA National Network, ADA NAT'L NETWORK, https://adata.org/about-adanational-network (last visited Oct. 24, 2021).

20. Catherine A. Okoro, et al., PrevalenceofDisabilitiesand Health Care Access by Disability
Status and Type Among Adults - United States, 2016, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION
(Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/67/wr/mm6732a3.htm?s_cid-mm6732a3_w.

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., KEY SUBSTANCE USE AND
MENTAL HEALTH INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2019 NATIONAL SURVEY
(2020),
3
(SAMHSA)
HEALTH
AND
USE
DRUG
ON
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/reports/rpt29393/2019NSDUIFFRPDFWHTML/2

0 9NSDUHFFRI PDFw090120.pdf.
24. See U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., OFF. OF DISABILITY EMP. POL'Y, SURVEY OF EMPLOYER
PERSPECTIVES ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: TECHNICAL REPORT 3, 5 (2008),
https://www.dol.gov/odep/research/SurveyEmployerPerspectivesEmploymentPeopleDisabilities.pdf
(finding that only 8.7 percent of companies reported hiring people with disabilities during the twelve
months preceding November 2008, and that employers cited "nature of the work" as a concern for

hiring people with disabilities).
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accommodations because of their disabilities, demonstrate the vitality and
impact of biases on their employment opportunities. 25
These significant barriers to employment faced by people with
disabilities lead to employment rates that lag significantly behind rates for
people without disabilities, at rates of 36.7% for the former versus 76.6%
for the latter, both as of December 2021.26 One should not assume that
people with disabilities cannot or do not choose to work given that one
survey among unemployed people with disabilities showed that 25.8%
were seeking work, 27 and 36% of those jobseekers had experienced an
employer who incorrectly assumed that they could not do their job
because of their disability. 2 8 Given this experience, it is important to
29
understand biases against hiring or retaining a person with a disability,
and to review how the courts have addressed these biases in litigation
under the ADA. 30
The second part of this paper explores the reluctance of courts to
consider employers' biases against people with disabilities in reviewing
claims of discrimination. 3 1 People often reveal their disability to obtain
an accommodation that is both guaranteed under the ADA and essential
to their inclusion and continuation as contributing members of the labor
force. 3 2 While the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act
(hereinafter "ADAAA") of 2008 expanded the scope of the ADA's
coverage of people with impairments, 33 the ADA retained its requirement
that people with disabilities provide explicit information about their

25. See KESSLER FOUND., THE KESSLER FOUNDATION 2015 NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND
DISABILITY
SURVEY:
REPORT
OF
MAIN
FINDINGS
20-22,
25
(2015),
www.kesslerfoundation.org/sites/default/files/filepicker/5/KFSurveyl 5_Results-secured.pdf
(showing a survey conducted by the University of New Hampshire).
26. See nTIDE December 2021 Jobs Report: Employment Remains above Historic Levels for
People with Disabilities, KESSLER FOUND. (Jan. 7, 2022), https://kesslerfoundation.org/pressrelease/ntide-december-2021-jobs-report-employment-remains-above-historic-levelspeople?utmsource=direct-homepage&utm_medium=banner&utmcampaign=ntide-december2021 -jobs-report-employment-remains-above-historic-levels-people.
27. See KESSLER FOUND., supranote 25, at 15-16.

28. Id. at 19-20.
29.
30.

Infra Part I.
Infra Part I.B.

31. Infra Part II.
32. See Stacy Hickox & Keenan Case, Risking Stigmatization to Gain Accommodation, 22 U.

PA. J. BUS. L. 533, 571-80 (2020) (explaining that an employee's failure to provide clarifying medical
information can end the employer's duty to interact and that the ADA decisions have placed a heavy
burden of an employee seeking accommodation to reveal both the existence of a disability and the
limitations that flow from that disability).
33. See Michelle A. Travis, Disqualifying Universality Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act Amendments Act, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1689, 1696, 1699, 1707 (2015).
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disability to access the ADA's right to reasonable accommodations. 34
The failure of courts to hold employers accountable for the disparate
treatment and retaliation arising from such a request for accommodation
may result from belief that the ADA's accommodation process is a form
of "special treatment," benefitting individuals with disabilities "at the
expense of the nondisabled workforce." 3 5
ADA disparate treatment and retaliation claims often arise after a
plaintiff has requested an accommodation for her disability, perhaps
because employers first learn of a hidden disability at this time and
because employers react negatively to any request for an
accommodation. 3 6 Protection against retaliation claims aims to uphold
the right to accommodations under the ADA.3 7 As one court explained,
"[t]he right to request an accommodation in good faith is no less a
guarantee under the ADA than the right to file a complaint with the [Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission]." 38 However, a 2019 study of
retaliation claims under the ADAAA showed that of 294 cases, only 25%
survived a motion for summary judgment filed by the employer. 39 This
study suggests that ADA plaintiffs alleging retaliation may not be able to
rely on a retaliation claim to protect their right to request the
accommodations they need. 40
The second part of this paper includes an in-depth analysis of the
U.S. courts' approach to discrimination claims under the ADA, based on
a legal analysis of 143 federal court decisions in which employees were
required to prove that their disability was the but-for cause of their
disparate treatment or retaliation. 4 1 To survive a motion for summary
judgment in a claim of disparate treatment or retaliation, that employee
must produce evidence of a prima facie claim of discrimination and
evidence that the employer's reason for taking an adverse action against
them was a pretext for discrimination. 4 2
Our review examines courts' reliance on statements linking the
treatment of the employee to their disability or protected activity, such as
requesting an accommodation, as well as the influence of the temporal
proximity between the revelation of the employee's disability and the
34.
35.
36.
37.

See Hickox & Case, supranote 32, at 560-67
See Travis, supranote 33, at 1690-91.
See Porter, supranote 11, at 851-52.
See id. at 828 (describing requesting an accommodation as a "protected activity").

38.

Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc., 318 F.3d 183, 191 (3d Cir. 2003).

39.

See Porter, supranote 11, at 836.

40. See id at 852.
41.

See infra Part II.

42. See Yarberry v. Gregg Appliances, Inc., 625 F. App'x 730, 737 (6th Cir. 2015).
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43
adverse action in avoiding dismissal of a claim on summary judgment.
Our review also demonstrates the significant influence of courts'
deference to employers' reasons for taking an adverse action, even shortly
after their disability was revealed and after the employer made derogatory
disability or request for
an employee's
about
statements
accommodation.44
The paper concludes with recommendations to better address the
potential for biases against people with disabilities to result in disparate
Courts should reevaluate the evidence
treatment or retaliation.4 5
necessary for an employee with a disability to defeat a motion for
summary judgment, taking into account the continuing influence of one's
revelation of a disability on an employer who has been asked to
accommodate her.4 6 At a minimum, when an adverse action occurs
shortly after the revelation of a disability, and statements by the employer
indicate some causation, then a jury should decide whether the employee
with a disability has proven the requisite discriminatory or retaliatory
intent. 47

EVIDENCE OF BIAS AND ITS EFFECTS

I.

Studies and surveys have long documented discrimination faced by
applicants and employees with disabilities in the U.S. 48 Discrimination
starts with the hiring process: a 2008 survey of 3,797 employers in the
U.S. showed that only 19.1% knowingly employed employees with
disabilities, and only 8.7% reported hiring a person with a disability
within the past twelve months. 49 In describing challenges in hiring people
with disabilities, employers cited "discomfort or unfamiliarity"
(32.2%),50 "attitudes of co-workers" (29.1%),51 and "attitudes of
supervisors" (20.3%).52 In addition, 30.8% of the employers cited the
concern that "supervisors are not comfortable with managing" people
with disabilities, with a higher percentage among employers that do not

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See
See
See
See
See

infra Part H.B.
infra Part H.E.1.
infra Part III.
infra Part III.
infra PartII.

48. See Michelle Maroto & David Pettinicchino, Twenty-Five Years After the ADA: Situating
Disability in America's System of Stratification, 35 DISABILITY STUD. Q., no. 3, at 1, 3, 6 (2015).
49.

See U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., supra note 24, at 2-3.

50. See id. at 13, 15.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 13.
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These reasons were
actively recruit people with disabilities. 53
consistently cited more often by employers who did not identify as
actively recruiting people with disabilities. 54 Similarly, employers
identified negative attitudes of customers as common challenges to
retaining employees with disabilities. 55 It is noteworthy that none of these
reasons concern the qualifications of the person with a disability. 56
Even if hired, people with disabilities face additional barriers to
For example, people with psychiatric disabilities can
success. 57
experience worse discrimination in the workplace than in any other
setting. 58 One survey of people with psychiatric disabilities revealed that
15.7% of the survey's participants experienced problems with a superior
who had a negative attitude related to their disability, and only 41.3%
were able to overcome this barrier; 59 15.5% experienced negative
attitudes from co-workers, and 54.5% of them were able to overcome that
barrier. 6 0 These attitudes were identified as more common barriers than
"needing special features or accommodations on the job (11.4%,
overcome by 57.4% of them). 6 1
The stigma associated with mental illness is "both greater and more
pervasive than the stigma associated with physical illness." 62 For
example, one survey of 200 human resource professionals found that a
physically impaired job applicant was more likely to be hired than an
applicant taking medication for a mental illness. 63 Employers can have
"preconceived notions" that certain health conditions "signal underlying
qualities about workers" with those conditions. 64 For example, the
stereotype that an applicant with a mental impairment is incompetent and

53. See id at 16.
54. See id. at 15.
55. See id at 20.
56. See id (showing the challenges consisting of attitude and cost concerns).
57. See Susan Stefan, Hollow Promises: Employment Discrimination Against People with
Mental Disabilities,3 AM. PSYCH. ASS'N 4 (2001).

58. Id.
59. See KESSLER FOUND., supra note 25, at 5, 20-21.

60. See id at 20-21.
61. See id. at 21.
62.
63.

Kaminer, supranote 1, at 216.
See Denise A. Koser et al., Comparisonof a Physicaland a Mental Disability in Employee

Selection: An ExperimentalExaminationofDirectand ModeratedEffects, 1N. AM. J. OF PSYCH. 213,
213, 216, 218 (1999); see also Elaine Brohan et al., Systematic Review of Beliefs, Behaviors and
Influencing FactorsAssociated with Disclosure of a Mental Health Problem in the Workplace, 12
BMC PSYCHIATRY (2012) (applicants with mental health problems consistently rated as less
employable than candidates with no disability or physical disability).
64. See Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Anticipating Accommodation, 105 IOwA L. REv. 621, 662

(2020).
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has difficulty functioning as a capable adult 65 can lead to their rejection
by employers.
Both subtle and overt discrimination has been experienced by
individuals with these forms of disabilities, which makes their interview
and work-life experiences even more difficult. 6 6 Some actual hurdles that
individuals with disabilities have faced include being blamed for acts they
did not commit, and beliefs that these individuals are weak, or that they
are just trying to receive special attention or advantages based on their
impairment. 6 7 The impact can be circular, because a failure to reveal a
hidden disability can result in a manager's misunderstanding about the
reasons for an employee's negative work outcomes, such as absenteeism
due to depression. 68
A. Sources andImpact of Bias
The negative treatment of people with disabilities by employers
arising from stigma and stereotypes associated with disabilities is
supported by fear and misunderstanding. 69 Such stereotypes include the
use of "imperfect proxies" and "overbroad generalizations." 70 Employers
fear that people with disabilities will be unable to carry out their duties
and negatively affect the company's performance.71 One study found that
only 33% of businesses would choose to hire a person with a disability
even if they were qualified, due in large part to the belief that employees
72
Relying
with disabilities are "less capable members of the workforce."
on similar assumptions, one court dismissed the claim of an applicant for
an EMT position who was an amputee based on the employer's unproven
See Kaminer, supranote 1, at 220.
See Ariella Meltzer et al., Barriers to Finding and Maintaining Open Employment for
Peoplewith IntellectualDisability in Australia, 54 SOC. POL'Y ADMIN. 88, 94-97 (2020).
67. See Pirjo Hakkarainen et al., Concealment of Type ] Diabetesat Work in Finland:A MixedMethod Study, 8 BMJ OPEN, Jan. 2018, at 1, 4-5 (2018) (main reason for nondisclosure was fear of
65.
66.

discrimination).
68. See De Lorenzo, supra note 10, at 134.
69. See Cynthia L. Harden et al., Reaction to Epilepsy in the Workplace, 45 EPILEPSIA 1134,
1135 (2004) (explaining how employers misunderstand how to treat those with disabilities like
epilepsy and put unnecessary restrictions on their ability to use machinery).
70. See Deborah Dinner, Beyond "Best Practices": Employment-Discrimination Law in the

NeoliberalEra, 92 IND. L. J. 1059, 1099 (2017).
71.

See Darlene D. Unger, Employers' Attitudes Toward Persons with Disabilities in the

Workforce: Myths or Realities?, 17 FOCUS ON AUTISM & OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 2,
4 (2002) (explaining how some studies show that employers are concerned with the productivity level
of those with disabilities which leads to a negative effect on a company's overall performance levels).
72. See Marjorie L. Baldwin & Steven C. Marcus, Perceivedand Measured Stigma Among
Workers with Serious Mental Illness, 57 PSYCH. SERVS. 388, 388 (2006).
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assumption that she could not perform the lifting duties of the position. 73
Additionally, employers often assume that people with disabilities will
create emotional disturbances in the workplace or have poor social

skills. 74
Employers tend to focus on fears that people with disabilities will
display unpredictable behaviors that could possibly put themselves or
others around them in danger. 75 They also are concerned that "working
is not healthy for people with a mental health problem" or the individual
will be unable or disinclined to treat their illness themselves (e.g. taking
medication) during the workday. 7 6 Managers and supervisors are worried
that these individuals with invisible disabilities will be unfit in their
workplace, but instead of making the reasonable adjustments, they choose
to mistreat them even if that is not their original intention. 77
Reliance on stigma and stereotypes about people with disabilities
also arises from a lack of education behind the nature of disabilities and a
lack of exposure to others with disabilities. 78 Supervisors and managers
have admitted that they do not know how to react and are fearful of the
unknown. 79 Their unfamiliarity with the nature of hidden disabilities in
particular makes them extremely uncomfortable and because of this they
tend to act uninterested, and do not provide or discuss the level of support
that these employees may need. 80 Several employers in one study noted
the lack of understanding towards the nature of diabetes among
employees, and explained, "linked to this lack of understanding of
diabetes was a tendency for managers to be disinterested and therefore not
likely to ascertain the level of support that might be needed." 81 Other
employer concerns include a lack of knowledge as to how to

73. See Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv. Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 32 (1st Cir. 2002).
74.

See Unger, supra note 71, at 4; see also Cam Hand & Joyce Tryssenaar, Small Business

Employers' Views on Hiring Individuals with Mental Illness, 29 PSYCH. REHAB. J. 166, 169-70
(2006).
75.

Harden, et. al., supra note 69, at 1135, 1138-39.

76. Elaine Brohan & Graham Thornicroft, Stigma and Discrimination of Mental Health
Problems: Workplace Implications, 60 OCCUPATIONAL MED. 414, 414 (2010).
77. See id.
78. See Annmarie Ruston et al., Diabetes in the Workplace - Diabetic's Perceptions and
Experiences of Managingtheir Diseaseat Work: A QualitativeStudy, BMC PUB. HEALTH 1, 6 (2013).
79. See id at 8.
80. See id. at 5 ("They know I'm diabetic, but that's it, they never asked anything about it or
what to do.").

81. Id.
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accommodate employees with disabilities and the potential for future
litigation. 82
Employers may view some health conditions as more ambiguous
than others, based on symptomatic differences, 83 leading to their
reluctance to hire individuals with some particular conditions. 4 For
example, one study showed a greater willingness to accommodate a
pregnant worker compared to a worker with a need for joint surgery, a
more ambiguous condition. 85 Such ambiguity may be perpetuated by the
inability of an employer to ask questions about an applicant's need for
86
accommodation prior to making a tentative job offer.
The third cause of stigma burdening employees with disabilities may
87
For
result from a perception that they are receiving "special-treatment."
example, requiring an employee to show that he or she is a person with a
disability to receive accommodation marks them "as separate and
88
different from all workers, who become normalized in the process."
This negative treatment may result from employers' perceptions that
89
even
accommodating employees is "expensive and burdensome,"
though the cost of turnover as well as decreased productivity and loyalty
of the employee who is not accommodated may be greater than the cost
of the accommodation itself.90 This perception results in an employer's
reluctance to hire or promote people with disabilities who "need or are
likely to need accommodations." 9 1 Ironically, employers seem to be less
92
Stigma may also
willing to accommodate if legally required to do so.
arise from coworkers who resent the accommodations afforded to an
employee with a disability, either because they are overburdened by that
93
accommodation or they resent being denied a similar accommodation.

82. H. Stephan Kaye et al., Why Don't Employers Hire and Retain Workers with Disabilities,
21 J. OF OCCUPATIONAL REHAB. 526, 527-30 (2011).

83.
84.
85.
86.

Shinall, supranote 64, at 662.
Id. at 662, 665.
See id. at 663-64.
See id. at 664-65.

87.

Nicole Buonocore Porter, Accommodating Everyone, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 85, 87

(2016).
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
PEPP. L.

Id. at 124.
Id. at 87.
See id. at 126.
Id. at 97.
See id.
Nicole Buonocore Porter, Special Treatment Stigma After the ADA Amendments Act, 43
REV. 213, 234 (2016).
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This stigmatization is well-documented and its causes are
understood. 94 But it is also important to understand its significant impact
on people with disabilities who are seeking to succeed in a workplace. 95
It is both the actual stigmatization and the fear of the same which create
barriers to their success. 96
B. Repercussions from Revelation of Disability
Because of the biases outlined above, many applicants and
employees are concerned about disclosure of a hidden disability based on
fears about that revelation's impact on their career .97 Among people with
disabilities surveyed in 2015, 72.7% of those currently or previously
employed were willing to discuss their disability with others at work, but
this percentage lowered to 67.5% for those with cognitive disabilities. 9 8
Conversely, this means that one quarter to one third of people with
disabilities do not feel comfortable disclosing their disability in their
workplace, even if they need to do so to be accommodated. 99
The anticipation or fear of negative reaction to the disclosure of a
disability influences behavior, even if that fear is unfounded. 100 For
example, employees with depression hesitate to disclose their disability at
work "because of the potential of being ridiculed or viewed as less
competent." 10 1 Anticipating such a reaction from a supervisor may cause
the individual with a disability to suffer from stress/fear, or even change
their behavior accordingly. 102 Consequently, anticipated fear limits
people with disabilities' opportunity and ability to find proper and
satisfying work. 103 Being too afraid to put themselves out there to find a
94. See id. at 260-63.
95. See generally id. at 254 (exploring the stigmas that individuals with disabilities experience
in the workplace and the harm experienced by individuals with disabilities because of special
treatment stigma).
96. See Katharina Vormbolt et al., Disability and Employment - Overview and Highlights, 27
EUR. J. OF WORK & ORG. PSYCH. 40, 49 (2018) (explaining that many individuals in many countries
around the world fail to disclose their disability because of the fear of stigmatization).
97. See De Lorenzo, supra note 10, at 134-35, 138; Kaminer, supra note 1, at 215; Dewa, supra
note 16, at 214; Munir, supra note 2, at 1398.
98. See KESSLER FOUND., supra note 25, at 24.

99.
100.

See id.
See id. at 25.

101. Angela J. Martin & Rebecca Giallo, Confirmatory Factor Analysis of a Questionnaire
Measure of Managerial Stigma Towards Employee Depression, 32 STRESS AND HEALTH: J. INT'L
SOC'Y FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF STRESS 621, 628 (2016).
102. Margaret H. Vickers, Dark Secrets and Impression Management: Workplace Masks of
People with Multiple Sclerosis (MS), 29 EMP. RESP. & RTS. J. 175, 178 (2017).

103. Id. at 176.
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place of employment, even though they are fully capable and qualified,
negatively affects their lifetime career path.1 04 These fears cause anxiety
and low self-esteem, adding to the negative self-perceptions of their
disability even more. 10 5 Consequently, many individuals pretend to not
even have the illness, so that others around them are unaware and cannot
think of them as any less of a person.1 06
Despite this potential for stigmatization, people with disabilities may
be required to disclose their disability to their employer for several
reasons. 10 7 First, prior to being hired, an applicant may be required to
complete a full medical examination. 108 Although the ADA stipulates that
this examination should not be used to discriminate against applicants
with disabilities and the information should be kept confidential,1 09 the
burden falls on the applicant to prove such discrimination, including proof
that her disability does not render her unqualified for the position. 1"0 For
example, the claim of a hearing-impaired applicant for a transfer with
Walmart was dismissed because he was unable to show that he was
qualified to perform the communication aspects of the position he
sought."' In reaching this decision, the court accepted the employer's
chosen communication method as the only way that the plaintiff could
11 2
fulfill the communications requirement of the position.
Accommodation can be essential for entry or retention in the
workforce. 13 An employee will also be required to reveal her disability
to justify a request for a reasonable accommodation."1 4 One study found
that a hidden disability is often disclosed in connection with a request for
accommodation; a need to be understood or to explain circumstances may

104. Id. at 188-89.
105. Id. at 178.
106. Id.
107. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.

§

12112(d)(3)-(4) (permitting

employers to require all employees to receive a medical examination, or submit to a medical
examination for job related purposes consistent with business necessity).
108. Id. § 12112(d) (prohibiting an employer from conducting a medical examination of a job
applicant unless, among other requirements, the employer has already made the applicant a job offer
conditioned on a medical examination).

109. See, e.g., Buchanan v. City of San Antonio, 85 F.3d 196, 198-99 (5th Cir. 1996).
110. See infra Part II-B.
111. See Barnhart v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 206 F. App'x 890, 892 (11th Cir. 2006); see also
Roberts v. City of Chicago, 817 F.3d 561, 566 (7th Cir. 2006) (plaintiffs failed to prove that they were
not hired because of disability rather than delays associate with obtaining medical clearance).

112.

See Barnhart, 206 F. App'x at 892.

113.

Matthew J. Hill et al., Employer Accommodation and Labor Supply of Disabled Workers,

41 LAB. ECON. 291, 292 (2016).
114.

Hickox & Case, supra note 32, at 538-39.
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also drive disclosure.1 15 A 2019 study reported that among 1,247
Americans, 14.7% were experiencing a work-limiting health problem,
and 22.3% were accommodation-sensitive, meaning that a workplace
accommodation could potentially enable them to work (79% of whom
were currently working)." 6
Past studies estimate that between one quarter and one third of
workers with disabilities are accommodated by their employers."1 7 One
study found that being non-white, agreeable, introverted, neurotic, or
having certain disabilities (back problems, emotion-related disabilities)
was significantly related to being less likely to be accommodated, whereas
higher education or job tenure of six to twelve years had a positive
correlation with receiving accommodation.' 18 One study concluded that
"policies targeting the disclosure environment for disabled workers may
be more effective in increasing accommodation rates than policies that
target the employer side of the accommodation equation alone."119
Despite the prevalence of need for accommodation, as few as one
quarter of accommodation-sensitive individuals ask their employers for
an accommodation.1 20 One study showed that among employees who
needed accommodations, 47.1% did not receive the accommodation they
needed.121 Yet approval of an accommodation led to a much higher
likelihood that they would be working both in the short and long term. 122
In addition to requests for accommodation, a current employee may
be required to complete a fitness for duty examination to establish one's
ability to continue performing work duties. 123 Even though that employee
is protected against discrimination based on the results of that
examination, 124 the resulting medical information can be used by an
employer to establish that the employee is not otherwise qualified for her

115. Marsh Langer Ellison et al., Patterns and Correlates of Workplace Disclosure Among
ProfessionalsandManagers with PsychiatricConditions, 18 J. OF VOCATIONAL REHAB. 3, 12 (2003).
116. Nicole Maestas et al., Unmet Need for Workplace Accommodation, 38 J. OF POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 1004, 1013, 1018, 1023 (2019).

117. Hill et al., supranote 113, at 291.
118. Id. at 296 tbl. 4, 297, 298 tbl. 6.
119. Id. at 301.
120. Maestas et al., supranote 116, at 1024.
121. Id. at 1020.
122. See id. at 1021.
123. See, e.g., Watson v. City of Miami Beach, 177 F.3d 932, 935 (11th Cir. 1999) (ADA does
not require a police department to delay a fitness for duty examination until perceived threat becomes

real).
124. See, e.g., Krocka v. City of Chicago, 203 F.3d 507, 511 (7th Cir. 2000) (adverse
employment action against a police department because they placed the plaintiff, a chronically
depressed officer, into program for officers with disciplinary problems).
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position. 12 5 For example, an employee who was sent for an evaluation
was discharged just ten days after a report stating that the employee had a
"thought disorder and deeply ingrained personality issues" was provided
to his employer. 126
This need to reveal one's disability as part of the hiring,
accommodation, or retention process raises serious concerns about the
potential for stigmatization and stereotyping based on that information
revealed.1 27 If a supervisor or coworker acts based on these biases, the
person with a disability can be subjected to disparate treatment and/or
retaliation.1 28
C. Study Results
Personal accounts of the biases and conflicts described above were
revealed in the author's survey and interviews of employees of a large
mid-western university. 12 9 The survey was conducted during the Summer
of 2019 among university employees registered with the university's
Resource Center for Persons with Disabilities (hereinafter "RCPD"),
which certifies employees' eligibility for accommodations.1 3 0 The survey
asked employees about their experiences in revealing a disability to obtain
accommodations.'1 3 The most common accommodations requested by
these employees included paid or unpaid time off for medical needs
(28.9%), modification of the physical environment (35.6%), provision of

125. Id. at 515 (the results of a medical evaluation may be used by an employer to determine
whether an employee is able to continue working).

126. Krowiak v. BWXT Nuclear Operations Grp., Inc., No. 1:18 CV 629, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
184027, at *7-8 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 25, 2018); see also Andrekovich v. Borough of Punxsutawney, No.

17-1041, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184557, at *13-14 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2018) (police department
required an employee to remain on administrative leave to undergo additional counseling and
evaluation despite the evaluating doctor's recommendation that the employee should retorn to work.).

127. See generally ABA Comm'n on Disability Rts., Implicit Biases & People with Disabilities,
ABA
IMPLICIT
BIAS
GUIDE,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/diversity/disabilityrights/resources/implicit bias/
(last visited Oct. 22, 2021) (references numerous studies to demonstrate employers prefer to hire

people without disabilities).
128. See generally id (implicit and explicit biases related to disabilities can lead to
discriminatory employment practices).

129. Stacy Hickox, RCPD Survey Data (July 19, 2021) (on file with author); see also infra
Appendix B (listing the questions asked of participants).
130. About RCPD, MICH. STATE UNIv., https://www.rcpd.msu.edu/about-rcpd (last visited Dec.
27, 2021).
131. Hickox, supra note 129; infra Appendix B.
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tools or assistive technology to help complete tasks (24.4%), or a flexible
work schedule (20%).132
In the forty-six responses to the general question regarding their
accommodation process, 15.2% disagreed and 8.7% strongly disagreed
that they were "satisfied with the results of the accommodation request
process," while 28.3% strongly agreed and 28.3% agreed with that
statement. 133 When asked to characterize the accommodation process,
17.4% responded "difficult" and 30.4% responded "somewhat difficult,"
whereas 21.7% responded "somewhat easy" and 10.7% responded
"easy."134 Overall, more than 56% agreed or strongly agreed that they
were satisfied with the results of the accommodation request process. 135
In contrast to this expression of general satisfaction, when asked
specifically about their relationship with their supervisor, 11.1% strongly
agreed and 20% agreed with the statement that "my relationship with my
supervisor was negatively affected by the accommodation process,"
whereas 22.2% disagreed and 28.9% strongly disagreed with that
statement. 136 Interestingly, a much lower percentage of employees
reported a worsened relationship if they first went to their supervisor with
an accommodation request, compared to employees who first sought
certification of their disability by the university.1 37 In one explanation of
whether the employee needed and/or received assistance to complete the
accommodation request, one respondent noted that "the special
accommodation shouldn't have been necessary, but because of
harassment by my unit supervisor, and a lack of cooperation by HR and
Parking Services, I was forced to independently pursue a formal
accommodation from RCPD, which I received, but ultimately, was not
honored."1 38
The survey demonstrated that a large percentage of employees were
hesitant to reveal their disability in the workplace. In response to the
statement "I can be honest with my supervisor about my disability and
how it affects me," 56.5% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed,
whereas 17.4% disagreed and 17.4% strongly disagreed. 139 39.1% of
respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "I feel in control

132.
133.
134.
135.

136.
137.
138.
139.

Hickox,
Hickox,
Hickox,
Hickox,
Hickox,

supra note
supra note
supra note
supra note
supra note

129;
129;
129;
129;
129;

infra Appendix
infra Appendix
infra Appendix
infra Appendix
infra Appendix

B
B
B
B
B

at
at
at
at
at

Question
Question
Question
Question

3.
9.
8.
8.

Question 10.
Compare infra Appendix B at Question 10, with infra Appendix B at Question 4.
Hickox, supra note 129 at Question 6.1.
Hickox, supra note 129; infra Appendix B at Question 14.
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of the accommodation process and how it affects me," whereas 17.4%
disagreed and 19.6% strongly disagreed with that statement. 140
Employees also revealed practices which did not protect the privacy
of their health information, which could contribution to more widespread
stigmatization by coworkers and supervisors.14 1 Regarding the health
information connected to an employee's request for accommodation,
51.1% of employees agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that
"only the necessary information to provide my accommodation was given
to my supervisor," whereas 20% disagreed or strongly disagreed with that
statement. 142
Employees revealed perceptions of stigmatization as well. 143 When
asked for reaction to the statement that "stereotypes/stigma related to my
disability have negatively influenced how peers and supervisors treat me,"
26.1% strongly agreed and 26.1% agreed, whereas only 10.7% disagreed
and 13% strongly disagreed. 144 More broadly, in reaction to the statement
"disclosing my disability has helped achieve my goals at work," 15.6% of
respondents strongly disagreed and 24.4% disagreed, whereas 20% agreed
and 11.1% strongly agreed. 145
Survey respondents were asked to participate in a follow up
interview to gain more insight into their experiences in requesting
accommodations. 146 While some of the six interviewed employees did
not reveal any negative repercussions from revealing their disability to
obtain an accommodation, some related a much more negative
experience. 147 One employee described significant negative treatment
from a supervisor after requesting to work remotely as an accommodation,
and another employee was accused of lying after requesting
accommodations to reduce allergic reactions. 148 A third employee
received a negative performance evaluation because her disability
affected her ability to work a regular schedule, even though she had asked
for a revised schedule as an accommodation. 149 Several employees also

140.
141.

Hickox, supra note 129; infra Appendix B at Question 15.
Hickox, supra note 129; infra Appendix B at Question 13.

142.

Hickox, supra note 129; infra Appendix B at Question 13.

143.
144.

Hickox, supra note 129; infra Appendix B at Question 11.
Hickox, supra note 129; infra Appendix B at Question 11.

145. Hickox, supra note 129; infra Appendix B at Question 12.
146. Hickox, supra note 129; infra Appendix B at Question 17.
147. See Keenan Case, Mich. State Univ., Presentation at the Mid-Michigan Symposium for
Undergraduate Research Experiences (July 24, 2019) (on file with author).

148.
149.

See id.
See id.
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reported being excluded from meetings about their accommodation
requests between their supervisor and a representative from RCPD. 15 0
These survey and interview responses demonstrate that while a
majority of the employees were satisfied with the overall accommodation
process, a significant minority of the employees perceived that their
relationship with their supervisor was negatively impacted by the
process.15 1 A majority of employees also believed that stereotypes and/or
stigma related to their disability had negatively influenced their treatment
at work, and close to a majority disagreed that revealing their disability
had helped them achieve their goals at work.15 2 These results suggest that
supervisors and coworkers are still reacting negatively when learning
about an employee's disability, even after that person has been hired for
the position. 153
II.

PROVING CAUSATION IN THE COURTS

The stigmatization revealed, both in this study and in previous
research, should be addressed and remedied by non-discrimination laws.
Overall, these laws are intended to broaden employment opportunities for
members of a protected class "seeking economic opportunity and social
freedom," and attempt to reduce "the gap between an individual's true
capacities and identity and the capacities attributed to her" by her
membership in a protected class, such as disability. 154 In other words,
prohibitions against disparate treatment and retaliation should interrupt
employers' reliance on biases and stereotypes, and "reward[] workers for
the true value of their labor." 55
Nondiscrimination laws, including the ADA, aim to reduce the
"injury to individual potential" caused by employers' reliance on stigma
and stereotypes.1 56 Allowance of disparate treatment claims focuses on
the notion that membership in a protected class is "unrelated to job
productivity," so as to correct "market failures" caused by employers'
inefficient "propensity to discriminate." 1 5 7 It can also be said that non-

150. See id.
151. Hickox, supranote 129, at Question 10; infra Appendix B at Question 10.
152.
153.
154.

Hickox, supra note 129, at Question 12; infra Appendix B at Question 12.
See supra notes 132-46.
Dinner, supranote 70, at 1065.

155. Id. at 1102.
156. Id. at 1069.
157. Id. at 1087-88.
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discrimination laws prohibit decisions by employers that are simply
"wrong" and undermine "social equality." 15 8
Despite these lofty purposes and noble goals, discrimination and
retaliation continue to limit the opportunities of people with disabilities in
the workplace. 159 Employers often resist providing accommodations and
take adverse action against those who ask for them.1 60 Resistance to the
mandates of the ADA in particular may arise from the view that
accommodation claims under the ADA impose costs beyond those posed
by other nondiscrimination laws' "demand for an efficient
marketplace." 161 This view may explain why people with disabilities find
it so difficult to convince courts that an employer has intentionally
discriminated against them in violation of the ADA.1 62
The stigma and stereotyping described earlier not only affects
employers' reactions to requests for accommodation, but can also
influence the decisions of judges who review the claims of employees
who have suffered adverse actions. 163 These biases can lead to a court's
acceptance of an employer's reason to discharge an employee with a
disability. 164 Claims of disparate treatment by people with disabilities
may also be undermined by courts' tendencies to focus on conscious,
expressed intent to discriminate, 165 as evidenced by blatant ableist
statements by supervisors. This approach disadvantages people with
disabilities who often face discrimination based on risk assessment
influenced by unconscious or unspoken stereotypes or biases. 166
Regardless of the motivations of judges, employees and applicants
making claims under the ADA often face dismissal at either the trial or

158. Id. at 1104.
159. Kaminer, supranote 1 at 208.
160. See Porter, supra note 11, at 852.
161. Dinner, supranote 70, at 1103.
162. See generally id. (concluding that requests for accommodation are more contestable than
simple discrimination claims because accommodating a disability involves expending finite social
resources).
163. Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with PsychiatricDisabilities, Employment

Discriminationand the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 52 ALA. L. REv. 271, 272-73 (2000).
164. See, e.g., Wilson v. Chrysler Corp., 172 F.3d 500, 513 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring) ("Paranoid schizophrenia often entails the sort of violent outbursts ... that an employer
need not accommodate."); Ann Hubbard, The ADA, the Workplace, and the Myth of the 'Dangerous

Mentally Ill', 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 849, 921-22 (2001) (criticizing court's evidence-free
assumption about the plaintiff's "inability to control her behavior.").
165. See generally, Mark C. Weber, Accidentally on Purpose:Intent in DisabilityDiscrimination
Law, 56 Bos. COLL. L. REv. 1417, 1417 (2015) (the requirement for intent is wrongfully inferred and
enforced by courts).
166. See Hubbard, supranote 164, at 921.
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appellate level. 167 Some experts have called the ADA's track record on
improving employment opportunities for individuals with disabilities
"dismal." 168 Even after the 2009 amendments (the ADAAA), summary
judgment was granted to the employer in 20.7% of cases involving
physical illness and 40% of cases involving mental illness, 169 decreasing
from pre-ADAAA employer win rates of 78.3% in cases involving a
physical disability and 60% in cases involving a mental disability. 170 This
increase in win rates for people with disabilities likely resulted from the
expanded definition of who is a person with a disability, rather than some
expansion of the opportunity to establish disparate treatment based on
that disability.1 7
After the passage of the ADAAA, more people with disabilities face
dismissal of their claims based on the employer's opinion that they lack
the qualifications to perform the job they seek or hold, often because the
employer is unwilling to accommodate them.1 72 Under the ADAAA,
discrimination claims which reached the issue of whether the person with
a disability was qualified were decided in favor of the employer in 69.7%
of trial court cases, compared to 47.9% of the cases prior to the ADAAA
amendments.1 73 These decisions on motions for summary judgment
prevent plaintiffs from even getting to the issue of whether the employer
acted with an intent to discriminate based on his or her disability. 174
These low win rates for plaintiffs facing motions for summary
judgment result from the expansive definition of essential functions of
jobs so as to exclude people with disabilities based on qualification

167.

See Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA.

L. REV. 555, 566 (2001); Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for
Defendants, 34 IIARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 99, 100 (1999) (defendants prevailed in more than ninetythree percent of the ADA cases decided on the merits at the trial court level, and in eighty-four percent
of the cases that were subsequently appealed); McCarthy Weisberg Cummings, P.C., Disabled

&

Workers Still Face Discrimination in the Workplace, DISABLED WORLD (Aug. 26, 2010),
Study
Finds
www.disabled-world.com/disability/discrimination/workplace-discrimination.php;
Employers Win Most ADA Title I Judicial and Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 403, 404 (1998).
168. PETER BLANCK ET AL., IS IT TIME TO DECLARE THE ADA A FAILED LAW?, THE DECLINE
OF EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: A POLICY PUZZLE 301 (David C. Stapleton
Upjohn
INST.
eds.,
W.E.
Richard
Burkhauser
https://research.upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1175&context=uppress.
169.

2003),

Kaminer, supra note 1, at 224.

170. Id.
171. Id.
172.

Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes Under the ADA

Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027, 2031-32 (2013).
173. Id. at 2055.
174. See id. at 2071.
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standards such as a lack of skills or characteristics. 175 This approach
"imbeds disability and impairment-based stereotypes and assumptions
into the definition of work and the workplace itself, making them even
more difficult to recognize and disrupt." 176 Moreover, the essential
qualifications for a job sought by a person with a disability, often
including when and where those duties are accomplished, most often
depends on an employer's own judgment.1 7 7 This approach allows
disability-based stereotypes to influence the "definition of the workplace
itself."1 7 8 Arguably this approach undermines the entire purpose of the
179
ADA to open up the labor market for people with disabilities.
This paper's review of ADA decisions goes beyond earlier studies
by examining the heavy burden of avoiding summary judgment even after
the plaintiff has established that she is a person with a disability who is
otherwise qualified for the position.1 80 The heavy burden of establishing
an employer's discriminatory intent is revealed by our review of 143 court
decisions involving claims by employees with disabilities who alleged
disparate treatment and/or retaliation connected to their disability.181
These decisions were chosen because the claim was specifically decided
(at least in part) based on the court's determination as to whether the
alleged disparate treatment or retaliation was because of an employee's
disability or protected activity, typically following a request for
accommodation or some other incident that revealed the employee's
disability to her employer. These decisions were gathered from a broad
search of Nexis UNI and Bloomberg BNA, including both reported and
unreported decisions. Decisions were excluded if the outcome was
determined by a plaintiff's failure to prove that she was disabled as
defined by the ADA, or that she lacked qualifications for the job even if
provided with reasonable accommodations. Many of these decisions also
included claims of harassment and failure to provide a reasonable
accommodation, but this analysis focuses on the outcome of the disparate
treatment and/or retaliation claims.
Of the 143 decisions reviewed, ninety-five (66.4%) were decided in
favor of the employer and forty-eight (33.6%) in favor of the plaintiff

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Travis, supra note 33, at 1702-03, 1712, 1721.
Id. at 1706-07.
Id. at 1710, 1715.
Id. at 1720.
Id. at 1757.
See infra Part lI.E.3.
See infra Appendix A.
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employee with a disability.1 82 Of these 143 decisions, eighteen were
decided on a motion to dismiss, 120 were decided on a motion for
summary judgment, and five were decided on post-trial motions. 183 Of
those 120 decisions decided on a motion for summary judgment, eightysix (71.7%) were decided in favor of the employer and in the eighteen
cases decided on motions to dismiss, 33.3% were decided in favor of the
employer. 184 The relatively more favorable outcome for employers filing
motions for summary judgment is unsurprising given the lower threshold
for a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss. 185
These decisions were analyzed to determine the impact, if any, of the
plaintiff's characteristics. Gender of the plaintiff did not appear to be a
significant factor, in that the win rate for male plaintiffs was 32.0% and
the win rate for female plaintiffs was 35.3%.186 The type of disability
experienced by the plaintiff seems to be a somewhat more influential
factor in the outcome of the decision. Table 1 displays the different
outcomes according to the type of disability:
TABLE 1. Influence of Disability Type1 87
Disability Type

Number of claims

Outcome in favor of
employer

Mental Illness/Psychiatric Disability

32

24 (75%)

Mental Illness & Cognitive

1

0

Mental Illness & Physical
Impairment

3

3 (100%)

Cognitive Impairment

3

2 (66.6%)

Physical Impairment

99

64 (64.6%)

Physical & Cognitive

3

1 (33.3%)

Impairment

182. See infra Appendix A.
183. See infra Appendix A.
184. See infra Appendix A.
185. Compare Watts v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating that the
Court must accept the factual allegations as true and construe them broadly in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff when reviewing a motion to dismiss), with Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
("To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."'). See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
(establishing that a court may dismiss a case for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.").

186.
187.

See infra Appendix A.
See infra Appendix A.
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It was surprising, given the research on stigmatization of people with
mental illness in particular,18 8 that the negative outcomes were not
significantly higher for plaintiffs suffering from mental illness compared
to the disabilities experienced by other plaintiffs.
A. Proofof Causation
The high likelihood that an employee's claim of disability
discrimination will be dismissed even before it reaches a jury
demonstrates the weight of the burden to establish that their employer
acted with discriminatory and/or retaliatory intent. 189 These dismissals
occur even where the plaintiff has established that she has a disability and
is otherwise qualified for the position in question.' 90 In the absence of
direct evidence of discriminatory intent, such as a statement that "we fired
Joe because of his disability," a plaintiff must rely on "circumstances
which tend to prove that an illegal motivation was more likely than the
reason offered by the [employer],"'91 under the ADA's "but-for"
causation standard. Our review demonstrates that courts often engage in
their own interpretation of these factual circumstances on a motion for
summary judgment, blocking an opportunity for the plaintiff to convince
a jury that the employer acted on the biases and stereotypes documented

above. 192
In general, a motion for summary judgment in a claim of
employment discrimination should only be granted if an employer "shows
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."1 93 Thus, reasonable inferences
should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff with a disability, and genuine
disputes of fact should be resolved by a jury. 194 In employment
discrimination claims, this means that where the outcome depends upon
witnesses' credibility or other disputes as to the sufficiency of the

188. See supra PartL
189. Alexandra Zabinski, Surviving the "Pretext" Stage of McDonnell Douglas: Should
Employment Discrimination and Retaliation Plaintiffs Prove "Motivating Factors" or But-For
Causation?, 40 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. J. PUB. POL'Y & PRAC. 280, 281, 283 (2019).
190. See supra Part II.

191. See Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994); Rafferty
v. Giant Eagle Mkts, Inc., No. 2:17-CV617, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186643, at *14 (S.D. Ohio Oct.
31, 2018).
192.

See supra Part I.

193.
194.

Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656-57 (2014).
See id. at 660.
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evidence of discriminatory intent, a jury rather than a judge should decide
This deference to juries in making credibility
the outcome. 195
determinations provides employees with the opportunity to present all of
the evidence supporting a claim of disparate treatment and avoids the
influence of an individual judge's biases on the interpretation of that
evidence. 196
The ADA prohibits intentional discrimination "on the basis of
disability."' 9 7 Some have argued that this standard of proof adopted in
2009 under the ADAAA amendments should be easier to meet,1 9 8
compared to the original ADA's prohibition of discrimination "because
of' a disability.1 99 In contrast to the ADAAA, Title VII's language was
amended in 1991 to allow for disparate treatment claims where the
plaintiff's "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating
factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also
The Supreme Court subsequently has
motivated the practice." 200
interpreted this language as preventing dismissal of disparate treatment
claims where an employee's protected class was "a motivating factor for
an adverse employment decision." 20 1
The "on the basis of' language, found both in the ADAAA and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (hereinafter "ADEA"),
incorporates a "but-for" standard to prove discriminatory intent,

195. See Valderaz v. Lubbock Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 611 F. App'x 816, 827 (5th Cir. 2015) (Dennis,
J., dissenting).
196.
Simple

Hon. Bernice B. Donald & J. Eric Pardue, BringingBack ReasonableInferences: A Short,
Intersection of
at
the
Problems
Some
Addressing
Suggestion for

Employment Discriminationand Summary Judgment, 57 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REv. 749, 763 (2013) ("A
liberal application of reasonable inference-drawing would alleviate, or altogether eliminate, many of
the barriers federal courts have placed in the path of employment discrimination plaintiffs."); Trina
Jones, Anti-DiscriminationLaw in Peril?,75 Mo. L. REv. 423, 433 (2010); Selmi, supra note 167, at

562.
197.
198.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
See, e.g., Grant v. Oceans Healthcare, LLC, No. 17-00642, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211504,

at *32 (M.D. La. Dec. 9, 2019) (requiring that adverse action be taken "in whole or in part because

of' the plaintiff's disability); Whalen v. City of Syracuse, No. 11-0794,2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95835,
at *23 (N.D.N.Y. July 15, 2014) (explaining that plaintiff must demonstrate that her disability was
"in the very least, 'a motivating factor'... if not a 'but-for' cause."); Siring v. Or. State Bd. of Higher

Educ., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1062-63 (D. Ore. 2013) (providing that no Congressional intent to
require dismissal of claims under the more onerous but-for standard); see also H.R. Rep. No. 110-

730, pt. 1, at 16 (2008) (explaining the legislative history of ADA and suggesting that "indirect
evidence" and "mixed motive" cases should be permitted under the ADA discrimination causes of
action).

199.
200.
201.

See H.R. Rep. No. 110-730, pt. 1, at 16.
42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2(m).
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 95 (2003).
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according to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the ADEA. 202 The
but-for standard allows dismissal of a claim of disparate treatment based
on an employer's evidence that "it would have made the same decision"
203
even if it had taken the employee's protected class into account.
Consequently, the ADAAA only protects employees who can prove that
an employer's discriminatory or retaliatory animus was outcomedeterminative. 20 4
The "but-for" standard of proof under the ADAAA has been adopted
by the Courts of Appeal for the Second Circuit, 205 the Fourth Circuit, 206
the Sixth Circuit,2 07 and the Ninth Circuit. 208 These courts reason that,
unlike Title VII, the "on the basis of' language in the ADAAA does not
allow a plaintiff to avoid dismissal by showing that discrimination was a
motivating factor in the decision. 2 09 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit explained that it failed to see any "meaningful textual difference"
between "on the basis of' in the ADAAA, and the term "because of,"
found in the ADA and the original Title VII, which has been interpreted
to require satisfaction of the "but-for" standard. 2 10 The Fourth Circuit
later granted summary judgment in favor of an employer where "an
employer acts with a mixed motive-both a discriminatory and nondiscriminatory reason" because the but-for standard "requires disability to
be more than a motivating factor: it must be the only motivating
factor." 21 1 This "but-for" standard has been relied upon subsequently to

202. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013); Gross v. FBL Fin.
Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009).
203. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a); Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. at 360; Gross, 557 U.S. at 173-74.
204.

Zabinski, supra note 189, at 303; see, e.g., McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d

1068, 1076 (11th Cir. 1996) (imposing liability on employer only where a person's disability "makes
the difference in the employer's decision"), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1228 (1997).
205. Natofsky v. City of New York, 921 F.3d 337, 348 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct.
2688 (2020).
206. See Gentry v. E. W. Partners Club Mgmt. Co., 816 F.3d 228, 235-36 (4th Cir. 2016)
(applying "but-for" causation standard based on ADA language prohibiting discrimination "on the

basis of' disability); Zabinski, supra note 189, at 286.
207. See EEOC v. W. Meade Place, LLP, 841 F. A'ppx 962,969 (6th Cir. 2021); Hunt v. Monro
Muffler Brake, Inc., 769 Fed. Appx. 253, 256 (6th Cir. 2019); Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp.,
681 F.3d 312, 321 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying "but-for" test).
208. See Murray v. Mayo Clinic, 934 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct.
2720 (2020).
209. Id. But see Flaherty v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 946 F.3d 41, 53 (1st Cir. 2019)
(stating in dictum that the plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer took the adverse employment
action "in whole or in part because of [her] disability.").

210. Gentry, 816 F.3d at 235-36.
211. Davis v. W. Carolina Univ. 695 F. App'x. 686, 688 (4th Cir. 2017).
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dismiss claims of disparate treatment2 12 and retaliation under the
ADAAA 2 13
Some see this adherence to the "but-for" standard as an expression
of courts' concern about the potential breadth of the ADA. 2 14 Regardless
of any court's motivation, adherence to the "but-for" standard for proving
discriminatory intent makes it more difficult for plaintiffs with disabilities
to establish disparate treatment caused by unconscious or subtle
discrimination. 2 15 Until the ADAAA is amended to lower this more
difficult standard of proof, it becomes even more important to understand
the courts' application of this standard where an employee faces an
adverse action after the revelation of her disability.
B. Prima Facie Evidence ofDiscriminatory Intent
To prove that an employer acted with the intent to discriminate under
the "but-for" standard, a plaintiff with a disability must first prove that the
employer had some knowledge of her disability. 2 16 But the more difficult
burden is to prove that the disability or their protected activity led to the
employer's decision to reject or discharge that person. 217 This review of
court decisions where the employer's intent was in dispute establishes just
how difficult it is for plaintiffs to meet that burden in the face of courts'
widespread use of motions for summary judgment to dispose of claims
where the factual issue of intent should determine the outcome of the
claim. 2 18 If a plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie claim of
disparate treatment, the case may even be dismissed on a motion to
dismiss. 2 19
An employee will fail to meet this initial burden of proof if the
decision makers implementing an adverse action did not know about the
employee's disability.or protected activity. 220 Courts have explained that
212. Donaldson v. Clover Sch. Dist., No. 0:15-1768-MBS-KDW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
155431, at *33 (D.S.C. July 24, 2017).
213. Wilson v. Montgomery Cty. Coll. Bd. of Trs., No. 17-cv-2784-PWG, 2021 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 54740, at *23 (D. Md. Mar. 23, 2021) (explaining that employer had "ample non-retaliatory
reason" to discharge plaintiff).

214. Selmi, supra note 167, at 556.
215. Id. at 571.
216. Tennial v. UPS, 840 F.3d 292, 306 (6th Cir. 2016); Nilles v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 521
F. App'x 364, 368 (6th Cir. 2013).
217. See Tennial, 840 F.3d at 306.
218. See Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2008).
219. See Moore v. Time Warner GRC 9,18 F. Supp. 2d 257, 262 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
220. Kaminer, supra note 1, at 251; Reutzel v. Answer Pro, LLC, No 17-944, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 130511, at *14 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 2019); Porto v. Chevron NA Exploration & Prod. Co., No.
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even an employer's knowledge of the symptoms of a plaintiff's disability
does not establish the employer's knowledge of the disability to support
ADA claims. 22 1 As the Sixth Circuit has recognized, "unless the
[employer] knew or believed that the plaintiff was disabled, or knew that
the symptoms were caused by a disability as defined by law, it would be
impossible for the [employer] to have made its decision because of the
disability." 2 22 Under this approach, one court dismissed the claim of an
employee with rheumatoid arthritis because an "employer must be aware
of symptoms raising an inference of disability and not every complaint of
pain or statement relaying the medications an employee is taking
necessarily creates such an inference." 2 23 This means that if an employee
has requested an accommodation but has not revealed or been asked about
"the specifics of [her] disabilities or restrictions" then she has failed to
establish a prima facie claim of disparate treatment. 224
Thus, even if the employee exhibits symptoms of her impairment at
work, the failure of an employer's deciding official to categorize those
symptoms as a disability will establish an employer's lack of notice of the
employee's disability. 225 This lack of knowledge defense has supported
the dismissal of a claim by an employee with a psychiatric disability who
had requested that his supervisor provide an accommodation and even
H-17-1419, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123757, at *31 (S.D. Tex. July 24, 2018); see also Whaley v.
Bonded Logic Inc., No. CV-19-02442-PHX-DJH, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171801, at *8 (D. Az. Sept.
18, 2020) (using the employer's decision to discharge made before employer learned of disability as

evidence in favor of granting employer's motion); Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC, 847 F.3d
384, 395 (6th Cir. 2017) (requiring that employer "knew or had reason to know" of her disability);
EEOC v. C.R. Eng., Inc., 644 F.3d 1028, 1049 (10th Cir. 2011); Ainsworth v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No.
3, 232 F. App'x 765, 771 (10th Cir. 2007) (providing that an employer must know of a disability
before it can be held liable under ADA).
221. Nilles, 521 F. App'x at 369; see also Cozzi v. Great Neck Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 05CV-1389 (ENV), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74305, at *42 (E.D.N.Y.+Aug. 21, 2009) (noting that
employer's knowledge of plaintiff's symptoms does not establish knowledge that plaintiff was

disabled); Moore, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 262 (noting that knowledge of plaintiff's diabetes or hypertension
is "not equivalent to knowing that his condition 'disabled' him within the meaning of the ADA.").

222. Yarberry v. Gregg Appliances, Inc. 625 Fed. Appx. 729, 737 (6th Cir. 2015); see also
Brown v. BKW Drywall Supply, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d 814, 829 (S.D. Ohio 2004) ("Knowing that an
employee has health problems, however, is not the same as knowing that the employee suffers from

a disability.").
223. EEOC v. Detroit Cmty. Health Connection, No. 13-12801, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165904,
at *25 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 26, 2014).
224. Arthur v. Am. Showa, Inc., 625 F. App'x 704, 708 (6th Cir. 2015).
225. See Crandall v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 146 F.3d 894, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (no
"adequate, prior alert to the defendant of the plaintiff's disabled status" where plaintiff displayed
extremely "rude behavior" but did not reveal to his employer that he suffered from bipolar disorder);

Taylor v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 159 (5th Cit. 1996) (explaining that there was an
insufficient notice of disability to employer where employee with worsening job performance told his
employer that he was bipolar but said he was all right, never offered more information).
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filed an EEO complaint, based on the court's finding that the "concurring
official" and "deciding official" taking the adverse action lacked
knowledge of his disability. 226 Similarly, a previous supervisor's
knowledge of a plaintiff's disability was insufficient evidence of the
current deciding supervisor's knowledge of her disability, even though
that decision maker took over the same position as the person with
knowledge of the disability. 227
An employer's awareness of an employee's disability typically arises
from communication with that employee, 228 often in connection with a
request for accommodation. Ironically, if an employee or applicant
chooses to forego accommodation because of a fear of discrimination, she
may have a difficult time proving that her employer acted with an intent
to discriminate. 229 In some cases, an employee has failed to establish
causation even when the disparate treatment is linked to such a request for
accommodation. 2 30 For example, even when an employee's request for
accommodation also referenced his disability, one court found no
evidence of causation because the employer's communications with the
plaintiff never indicated that his "medical condition itself was ever
discussed or at issue." 23 1
The reasoning of these courts ignores the inherent link between a
request for accommodation and the disability necessitating that
accommodation. These decisions fail to recognize that supervisors,
managers, and other decision makers may know enough about an
employee's disability through informal communications with other
employer representatives or even based on unsupported assumptions,
which led to an adverse action. Moreover, the "ignorance" of those
226. Lober v. Brennan, No. Cv-18-2640-PHX-DMF, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68694, at *15-16
(D. Az. Apr. 20, 2020); see also Bates v. Anthem Ins. Cos., No. 1:18-cv-502, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
142522, at * 16-18 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 10, 2020) (knowledge that employee requires leave and temporary
adjustment of schedule does not support inference that plaintiff's supervisor knew she was
disabled); Arthur, 625 F. App'x at 708 (noting that the decision maker was aware of restrictions but
unaware of specifics or why restrictions were imposed); Moloney v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No.

11-10924,2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16526, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 7, 2013) (noting that it is knowledge
of person who made the decision to terminate that is relevant).

227. Morgan v. J. C. Penney Co., No. 13-10023, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43069, at *7-9 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 31, 2014), recon. den'd 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62907 (E.D. Mich. May 7, 2014).
228. Yarberry v. Gregg Appliances, Inc. 625 Fed. Appx. 729, 737 (6th Cir. 2015).
229. JENNY YANG & JANE LIU, ECON. POL'Y INST., STRENGTHENING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
https://www.epi.org/unequalpower/publications/strengthening9
(2021),
DISCRIMINATION
accountability-for-discrimination-confronting-fundamental-power-imbalances-in-the-employmentrelationship/.

230. Israelitt v. Enter. Servs. LLC, No. SAG-18-1454, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38821, at *19 (D.
Md. Mar. 2, 2021).
231. Id. at *20.
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representatives regarding the scope of the ADA's coverage should not
allow them to escape the obligation to at least produce some legitimate
reason for an adverse action against that employee. 232
Even under these exacting standards to prove an employer's notice
of disability, some courts refuse to dismiss a claim based on an employer's
constructive notice of an employee's disability. Such notice may be
established "if an employee's symptoms are "severe enough to alert" it,
giving it either knowledge or "some generalized notion" of the
disability. 2 33 For example, where the employee was hospitalized and
unable to communicate more details with his employer, the Sixth Circuit
deemed that an employer had sufficient notice of the employee's mental
illness where his discharge was finalized after his supervisor learned of
his involuntary commitment to a mental hospital, combined with the
sudden onset of his extreme symptoms. 234 Similarly, a plaintiff avoided
dismissal of his disability discrimination claim based on his supervisor's
knowledge that he had used Family & Medical Leave Act (hereinafter
"FMLA") leave in the past, creating a question of fact regarding that
supervisor's knowledge of his disability. 2 35 This more enlightened
approach recognizes that discrimination can occur based on an
employee's disability even if the employer's representative has not
engaged in a legal analysis of whether the employee's impairment
qualifies under the ADA's definition of disability.2 36 This approach also
allows a jury, rather than a judge, to decide whether an employer was on
notice of an employee's disability.
Even if an employee can establish that her employer had knowledge
of her disability, a prima facie claim to survive a motion for summary
judgment will require evidence of a link between that disability and an
adverse action, which is often established by the temporal proximity
between the employee's revelation of a disability and the adverse action
taken against them. 237 Like a disparate treatment claim, a retaliation claim
will require some employer awareness of an employee's engagement in

232. Hedberg v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., Inc., 47 F.3d 928, 934 (7th Cir. 1995).
233. Nilles v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 521 F. App'x 364, 369 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Hedberg,
47 F.3d at 934 (some symptoms may be "so obviously manifestations of an underlying disability that
it would be reasonable to infer that an employer actually knew of the disability.").

234. Yarberry v. Gregg Appliances, Inc. 625 Fed. Appx. 729, 738 (6th Cir. 2015).
235. Buzulencia v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., No. 4:11CV2293, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102551, at *3
(N.D. Ohio July 28, 2014).
236.

See generally id. at *26 (the employer's representative had no knowledge of the plaintiff's

prior use of FMLA leave, nor his history of suffering from migraines).
237. See id at *32.
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some protected activity, such as requesting an accommodation. 238 To
establish a prima facie case of ADA retaliation, the plaintiff must prove
that: (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer took an
adverse employment action against her either subsequent to or
contemporaneous with the protected activity; and (3) there was a "causal
connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment
action." 239

In general, temporal proximity between the adverse action
experienced by the employee and disclosure of a disability can raise an
inference of unlawful discrimination or retaliation. 240 Thus, it is
important to understand the latitude afforded to employers who wish to
remove a person with a disability from employment by waiting for some
time to pass before taking an adverse action. 24 1
C. Role of Temporal Proximity in DisparateTreatment Claims
The temporal proximity between a revelation of an employee's
disability or engagement in protected activity can support a prima facie
claim of disparate treatment, yet the impact of such temporal proximity
carries some significant limitations.2 42 First, the timing must be close
enough to suggest some causation. 243 In addition, while temporal
proximity may establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, close
timing alone will be insufficient to avoid dismissal of a claim if an
employer provides some legitimate justification for its adverse action and
the plaintiff cannot show that reason to be pretextual. 244
238. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).
239. Oehmke v. Medtronic, Inc., 844 F.3d 748, 758 (8th Cir. 2016); LaRochelle v. Wilmac
Corp., 210 F. Supp. 3d 658, 698 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (causal connection); Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals,
626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010) (causal link); Freadman v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 484 F.3d
91, 106 (1st Cir. 2007) (causal connection); Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1178
(10th Cir. 1999).
240. Williamson v. Bon Secours Rich. Health Sys., 34 F. Supp. 3d 607, 615 (E.D. Va. 2014).
241. See Cormier v. City of Meriden, 420 F. Supp. 2d 11, 22 (D. Conn. 2006) (the district court
describes a "few months" period which allows for the inference of temporal proximity).

242. See Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286; 1302 (3d Cir. 1997).
243. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 274 (2001); see also Kane v. City of Ithaca,
No. 3:18-CV-0074, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188376, at *32 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2019) (discharged
three days after revelation of disability raises inference of discrimination); Kelly v. N. Shore-Long

Island Jewish Health Sys., 166 F. Supp. 3d 274, 286-87 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (plaintiff placed on
administrative leave two hours after revelation of disability raises inference of discrimination); Baron

v. Advanced Asset & Prop. Mgmt. Sols., LLC, 15 F. Supp. 3d 274, 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (disclosure
of disability five-six weeks before termination could be factor in determining that employer
discriminated against plaintiff).

244.

Morgan v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 585 F. App'x 152, 153 (4th Cir. 2014).
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In our review of 143 court decisions concerning disparate treatment
claims by plaintiffs with disabilities, sixty-eight involved adverse actions
which occurred within a relatively close time frame after the plaintiff
revealed her disability or engaged in protected conduct related to her
disability, typically a request for accommodation. 245 The outcomes of
those cases are displayed in the following table:
TABLE 2. Influence of Temporal Proximity 246
Close
Timing
Only

Close
Timing &
Relevant
Statements

Rejection
of
Reason &
Timing

Timing,
Statements
&
Rejection
of

Close
Timing &
Acceptance
of Employer
Reason

Statements
& Close
Timing but
Employer
Reason

Accepted

Employer
Reason

For
Employee
(48)

5

8

11

12

0

0

For
Employer
(96)

1

0

0

0

28

3

Success
Rate for
Plaintiffs

5/6

8/8

11/11

12/12

0/28

0/3

This table shows that plaintiff employees were most often successful,
in 12/48 (25%) of the cases decided in their favor, by establishing close
timing between the adverse action and the revelation or protected activity
combined with negative, relevant statements and an ability to otherwise
discredit the employer's reason for taking the adverse action. 24 7 Rejection
of an employer's reason for the adverse action combined with close timing
led to success for an additional eleven (22.9%) of the successful plaintiffs,
and combined with negative statements led to success for an additional
six (12.5%) of the plaintiffs. 248 Close timing combined with negative
statements led to the success of an additional eight (16.7%) of the
successful plaintiffs, whereas close timing alone only supported the
249
continuation of five (10.4%) out of forty-eight successful claims.

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

See infra Appendix A.
See infra Appendix A.
Supra Table 2.
Supra Table 2.
Supra Table 2.
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Close proximity between the revelation of a disability or engagement
in a protected activity, such as requesting an accommodation, and the
employer's adverse action can establish causation. 250 To effectively
prove discriminatory intent, the Supreme Court has suggested that
temporal proximity must be "very close." 25 1 In trying to define the precise
meaning of "very close," a collection of ADA decisions illustrates that
plaintiffs' adverse actions occurring up to two months after a requested
accommodation or the revelation of a disability allowed them to establish
a prima facie claim of disparate treatment or retaliation. 252 Temporal
proximity has established a prima facie case of retaliation based on a
separation of as much as three months between the engagement in
protected activity and the adverse action. 253 If an employer does not learn

250

See, e.g., Stryker v. HSBC Sec. (USA), No. 16-cv-9424, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158630, at

*40-43 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2020) (causation not shown because a year gap existed between the leave
taken and her disability and had a history of performance and attendance issues).

251. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268,274 (2001); see also Kane v. City of Ithaca,
No. 3:18-CV-0074, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188376, at *32 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2019) (noting that
discharge three days after revelation of disability raises inference of discrimination); Kelly v. N.

Shore-Long Island Jewish Health Sys., 166 F. Supp. 3d 274, 286-87 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (noting that a
plaintiff placed on administrative leave two hours after revelation of disability raises inference of

discrimination); Baron v. Advanced Asset & Prop. Mgmt. Sols., LLC, 15 F. Supp. 3d 274, 283
(E.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting that disclosure of disability five-six weeks before termination could be factor
in determining that employer discriminated against plaintiff).

252. Consedine v. Willimansett E. SNF, 213 F. Supp. 3d 253, 262 (D. Mass. 2016); see also
Horwath v. DHD Windows & Doors, LLC, No. 3:18-cv-1422, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106371, at *75
(D. Conn. June 17, 2020) (plaintiff placed on PIP shortly after revealing impairment); Mancini v.

Accredo Health Grp., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 243, 251 (D. Conn. 2019) (finding that discharge less than
two weeks after medical emergency establishes prima facie case of disability discrimination);

Pogorzelski v. Cmty. Care Physicians, PC, No. 6:16-cv-498, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54217, at *4
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2018) (discharge twelve days after disclosure of disability suffice as evidence of
discriminatory intent); Powell v. Merrick Acad. Charter Sch., No. 16-Cv-5315, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 32810, at * 19 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2018) (denying a motion to dismiss with one month between
disclosure and discharge); Budzban v. Dupage Cnty. Reg'l Office of Educ., No. 12C900, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5094, at *15-17 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2013) (showing a plausible connection to survive
motion to dismiss where termination shortly followed Plaintiff's request for accommodations);

Primmer v. CBS Studios, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 2d 248, 253-54, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (providing that less
than two months between health event and discharge was a sufficiently short amount of time to give
rise to inference of unlawful discrimination). But see Clark Cnty., 532 U.S. at 274 ("20 months later

suggests, by itself, no causality at all."); Zelasko v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Educ., No. 20-CV-5316, 2021
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119127, at *5-6 (E.D. N.Y. June 25, 2021) (finding no causation based on adverse
action 7 months after health event).

253. Goree v. UPS, 17-5139, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 22596, at *4-5 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 2017)
(finding three weeks between the protected activity and the adverse action); see also Sanchez-

Rodriguez v. AT&T Mobility P.R., Inc., 673 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2012) (finding that a three month
gap between filing EEOC complaint and employer discipline was "close enough to suggest

causation"); Col6n-Fontinez v. Mun. of San Juan, 660 F.3d 17, 37 (1st Cir. 2011) (finding that the
employer's knowledge of the protected activity close in time to the employer's adverse action can
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about a person's disability until an accommodation is requested, this
approach leaves an employee who has faced disparate treatment or
retaliation with a very short window of time in which an adverse action is
sufficiently causally related to the person's disability. 254
Under the Supreme Court's description of this requisite timing as
"very close," 255 lower courts vary in the amount of time which allows for
an inference of disparate treatment or retaliation. 256 In some cases, close
temporal proximity has been established by a gap of six to seventeen days,
between the request for accommodation and the adverse treatment by an
employer. 2 57 In other cases, temporal proximity has been recognized
despite a gap of as long as three months between protected activity and an
adverse action. 25 8 In stark contrast, other courts have deemed that a
period of two or three months between a request for accommodation and
259
Such a
an adverse action may be too long to establish retaliation.
variation must lead to confusion among both employees seeking to
establish discriminatory or retaliatory intent, and among employers who
seek to avoid liability based on an adverse action taken against an
employee with a disability.
As illustrated by these examples, courts have explained that "a
specified time period cannot be mechanically applied," 260 and that there
show causation); Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 720-21 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that
adverse action one month after protected activity supports prima facie claim of retaliation).

254. See Sdnchez-Rodriguez, 673 F.3d at 15; Tregalia, 313 F.3d at 720-21.
255. Clark Cry. Sch. Dist. , 532 U.S. at 273; Adams v. Persona, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 3d 973, 98283 (D.S.D. 2015); Porter, supra note 11, at 846.
256. Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 525 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Magee v.
Trader Joe's Co., No. 3:18-cv-01956-AC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76777, at *3 (D. Ore. Apr. 20,
2021) (adverse action occurred within one month of employee being placed on unpaid leave for

disability); D'Alessio v. Charter Commc'n, LLC, No. 18-cv-2738, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173332,
at *20 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2020) (time period of more than one year insufficient to support causation).

257. Bridgewater v. Mich. Gaming Control Bd., 282 F. Supp. 3d 985, 1001 (E.D. Mich. 2017);
Consedine, 213 F. Supp. 3d at 262; Cloe v. City of Indianapolis, 712 F.3d 1171, 1181 (7th Cir. 2013);
Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10" Cir. 1999). See also Israelitt, 2021 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 38821, at *25-28 (no summary judgment for employer where request for accommodation
was followed a few weeks after by adverse treatment).

258. Hixon v. TVA Bd. of Dir., 504 F. Supp. 851, 874 (E.D. Tenn. 2020); see also Dye v. Office
of Racing Comm'n., 702 F.3d 286, 306 (6th Cir. 2012) (causation based on adverse action taken two
to three months after plaintiff engaged in protected activity under ADA); Singfield v. Akron Metro.

Hous. Auth., 389 F.3d 555, 563 (6th Cir. 2004) (establishing prima facie retaliation under Title VII
by a three-month period between protected activity and discharge).

259. See Payne v. Cornell Univ., No. 18-cv-1442, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 864, at *57-8
(N.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2021) (finding no causation where adverse employment actions took place
approximately six months after she engaged in the protected activities); Perez v. Transformer Mfrs.,

Inc., 35 F. Supp. 3d 941, 954 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (finding no evidence of causal connection between
filing of plaintiff's discrimination charge and his termination).

260. van Asdale v. Int'l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 1003 (9th Cir. 2009).
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is no bright line to define the outer limits beyond which a temporal
relationship is too attenuated to establish a causal relationship. 26 1 Longer
lapses of time may not establish causation, unless the plaintiff can show
that some reason for a delay in the retaliatory action, 262 or ongoing
hostility such as a "pattern of antagonism" occurring during the
intervening period. 2 63
These decisions demonstrate the point that temporal proximity does
not establish a prima facie claim for all adverse actions taken after
engagement in protected activity. 264 If "some time" elapses between
when the employer learns of a protected activity and the subsequent
adverse action, "the employee must couple temporal proximity with other
evidence of retaliatory conduct to establish causality." 2 65
Even if an adverse action is taken within a short time after the
revelation of a disability or engagement in protected activity, summary
judgment still may be granted for an employer whose timing is consistent
with its justification for the adverse action.2 66 For example, a discharge
which occurred just days after a plaintiff with a disability returned from

261. Magnotti v. Crossroad Healthcare Mgmt., LLC, 126 F. Supp. 3d 301, 313 (E.D.N.Y. 2015);
Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Ivankovskaya v. Metro. Transp. Auth.
Bus Co., No. 15-cv-5727, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122598, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2017) (finding
that a passage of 2 months between request for accommodation and retaliatory act does not defeat

finding of causation); Abrams v. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 764 F.3d 244, 254-55 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting
that a temporal proximity of events may give rise to inference of retaliation); Infantolino v. Joint

Indus. Bd. of Elec. Indus., 582 F. Supp. 2d 351, 359 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2008) (finding that plaintiff
established prima facie retaliation claim despite two month lapse between protected activity and
adverse action.).

262. Hurd v. N. Y. Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 04-CV-998, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15635, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2007), aff'd sub nom. Hurd v. N. Y. C. Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 07-CV1250, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24727 (2d Cir. Dec. 8, 2008).
263. Curcio v. Roosevelt Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 10-CV-5612 (SJF), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
120144, at *44 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2012); see also Schmitt v. City of N.Y., No. 15-CV-05992, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187382, at *29 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2018) (showing a pattern of antagonism helped
establish causation despite less temporal proximity); Quinby v. WestLB AG, No. 04-CV 7406, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28657, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2007).
264. Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1302 (3d Cir. 1997).
265. Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 525 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Piligian v.
Icahn Sch. of Med. at Mt. Sinai, 490 F. Supp. 3d 707, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (showing a temporal
proximity of a few days combined with emails showing lack of intent to accommodate justified denial

of summary judgment for employer); McCoy v. MV Residential Prop. Mgmt., 2:14-CV-2642, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47733, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 8, 2016) (showing a gap in time between plaintiffs
complaints and his transfer, no other indicia of retaliatory conduct); Cormier v. City of Meriden, 420

F. Supp. 2d

11,

21-22 (D. Conn. 2006) (explaining that temporal proximity of a few months is

sufficient for prima facie case of retaliation).

266. Watson v. Fairfax Cty., 297 F. Supp. 3d 591, 604 (E.D.
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leave was justified by patient complaints about her behavior.2 67 Courts
often grant summary judgment for an employer that imposes an adverse
action in close temporal proximity when progressive discipline or an
investigation into the reasons for an adverse job actions began before the
an
accommodation
or
revealed
was
disability
plaintiff's
26 8
with a
employee
This approach makes it difficult for an
requested.
disability who may be having performance or attendance issues because
of her disability to establish a prima facie claim of discrimination based
on temporal proximity, if the employer begins any type of progressive
discipline or even just a critique of her performance before that employee
2 69
reveals her disability or requests an accommodation.
If the employer delays a decision regarding an accommodation after
that revelation occurs, then the person with a disability who is
subsequently subjected to an adverse action will have a difficult time
proving that the employer acted with discriminatory intent. 270 Moreover,
these decisions ignore the continuing potential influence of a request for
accommodation on future adverse actions against an employee who
continues to challenge an employer's denial of an accommodation, or who
receives an accommodation that draws resentment from supervisors,
managers, and/or coworkers. 27 1
This approach allows an employer to delay a decision to discharge
or otherwise punish an employee who has requested an accommodation,
which necessarily requires the disclosure of an employee's disability, and
consequently avoid a claim of retaliation. 272 Plaintiffs' reliance on close
temporal proximity between the revelation of a disability and an adverse

267. Mancini v. Accredo Health Grp., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 243, 251 (D. Conn. 2019); see also
Toussaint v. N.Y. Dialysis Services, Inc., 706 F. App'x 44, 45 (2d Cir. 2017) (affirming summary
judgment for employer even though employer erroneously credited a colleague's version of events).

268. Powell v. Merrick Acad. Charter Sch., No. 16-CV-5315, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32810, at
*21 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2018) (explaining plaintiff was subject to disciplinary action and her position
was "demonstrably at risk" before disclosure of disability); see also Telesford v. N.Y.C. Dept. of

Educ., No. 16-CV-819, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26242, at *9-10 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2021) (showing
plaintiff faced gradual adverse job actions long before disability arose); Gray v. Onondaga-Cortland-

Madison Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., No. 5:16-CV-973, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36231, at *22-23
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2020) (explaining that administrators started investigation into Plaintiffs alleged
inappropriate and unprofessional conduct before she submitted notice of her medical leave);

McDonnell v. Schindler Elevator Corp., No. 12-Cv-4614 (VEC), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96824, at
*38-42 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2014), aff'd 618 F. App'x. 697 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting that poor
performance evaluations were received before disability revealed).

269. See Powell, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32810 at *10.
270.

See Porter, supra note 11, at 854 n.270.

271. See id. at 852.
272. See id. at 841 (delaying grant of accommodation was not considered an adverse
employment action).
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action has led to the observation that "[a] savvy, well-counseled employer
knows that it cannot take an adverse employment action immediately after
a harassment or discrimination complaint." 273
This reasoning also ignores the ongoing influence of a revelation of
a disability or a request for accommodation that may continue to influence
an employer's treatment of an employee with a disability long after the
initial revelation or request.2 74 Because of the interactive process
associated with requests for accommodation, the employer may continue
to consider that employee's disability for a period of time that is
insufficiently "close" in time to satisfy courts' requirement of proof of a
prima facie claim of disparate treatment or retaliation.2 75
These decisions demonstrate that an employee with a disability may
have a difficult time establishing a prima facie claim of disparate
treatment or retaliation even if that adverse event occurred in a relatively
short amount of time after she revealed her disability to her employer. 276
Instead, many courts will be quick to dismiss that claim even without
evidence of a legitimate reason for the adverse action.
D. Deference to Employers' Reason for Adverse Action
Once a plaintiff presents a prima facie claim of discrimination under
the ADA, the employer has the "relatively light" burden to "articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for an adverse action taken against
a person with a disability. 277 In imposing this light burden, courts have
demonstrated extreme deference to employers' judgments regarding what
job duties are essential and whether the employee with a disability can
fulfill those duties. 278 This deference is exemplified by the dismissal of
the claim of an employee with a disability based on his employer's view
that his disability prevented him from "performing his job at a level that
met his employer's legitimate expectations." 279 In conferring this

273. Id. at 854.
274. See id at 843.
275. See id.
276. See id. at 825-26 (explaining requirements for establishing a prima facie claim and the
reasons many courts dismiss Plaintiffs' claims).

277. Weirich v. Horst Realty Co., LLC, No. 07-cv-871, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24526, at *7
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2009); Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994).
278.

Travis, supra note 33, at 1701.

279. Matthews v. Gee, No. 3:17cv271-HEH, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102549, at *14 (E.D. Va.
June 30, 2017); see also Melani v. Chipotle Serv., LLC, No. 3:17-cv-01177-AC, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 227041, at *39-47 (D. Ore. Sept. 4, 2019) (legitimatizing discharge ten days after revelation
of disability by assertion that plaintiff was discharged for unacceptable work performance); Brown v.
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deference to employers, courts often decline to act as "a super-personnel
office" by questioning an employer's "business judgment" to take an
adverse action against an employee, even if that employee has established
a prima facie case of disparate treatment or retaliation. 280
The significant influence of this deference to employers' reasons for
taking an adverse action against an employee with a disability is
illustrated by our review of 143 court decisions. 28 1 Decisions were
categorized as "Acceptance of Employer Reason" if the court relied on
the employer's proffered reason for taking an adverse action in granting a
motion for summary judgment or motion to dismiss in favor of the
employer. 28 2 Conversely, "Rejection of Reason" refers to a court's
questioning of whether the reason provided by the employer for taking an
adverse action was a pretext for discrimination or retaliation. 283 "Close
Timing" refers to a court's determination that the adverse action followed
closely in time after an employee's revelation of their disability or
an
such as requesting
activity,
in protected
engagement
accommodation. 2 84 "Statements" refers to statements by a decision maker
for the employer that directly relate to the employee's disability or
protected activity; this does not include statements that were deemed to
be unrelated, made by someone other than a decision maker, or otherwise
as "stray" statements that were insufficient to show an employer's
intent. 2 85

Duke Energy Corp., No. 1:13cv869, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54923, at *39 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2019)
(noting no causation where employer identified performance issues before disability arose).

280. Hunt v. Moro Muffler Brake, Inc., 769 F. App'x 253, 257 (6th Cir. 2019); Tingle v. Arbors
at Hilliard, 692 F.3d 523, 530-31 (6th Cir. 2012); Klimek v USW Local 397, 618 F. App'x 77, 80 (3d
Cir. 2015); Harp v. SEPTA, No. 04-2205, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35344, at *12 (E.D. Pa. June 1,
2006).
281. See infra Appendix A.
282. See infra Table 3.
283. See infra Table 3.
284. See infra Table 3.
285. See infra Table 3.
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TABLE 3. Influence of Employer's Reason 286
Outcome

For Employee

For Employer

Success Rate for

(N=48)

(N=95)

Plaintiffs

0

40

0/40

0

28

0/28

0

4

0/4

0

3

0/3

3

0

3/3

6

0

6/6

0

11/11

0

12/12

Acceptance of
Employer Reason

Only
Close Timing &
Acceptance of
Employer Reason

Acceptance of
&

Employer Reason
Statements

Statements & Close
Timing but Employer
Reason Accepted

Rejection of
Employer Reason

Only

&

Rejection of
Employer Reason
Statements

Rejection of Reason
& Timing
Timing, Statements &

12

Rejection of
Employer Reason

Of the ninety-five out of 143 decisions in which the employer
succeeded in its motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment,
courts most often (75/95 cases) relied on their acceptance of the
employer's reason for taking an adverse action against the plaintiff.2 87
This acceptance occurred even in 28 of those cases where the adverse
action took place close in time to the revelation of the plaintiff's disability
or engagement in protected activity, such as asking for an
accommodation. 288 Employers also had success in four of those seventyfive cases where the court accepted its reason for the adverse action even
if the plaintiff submitted evidence of negative statements related to their
disability or protected activity, and in three of those cases even where the

286.

See infra Appendix A.

287.
288.

See supraTable 3.
See supraTable 3.
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289
This
plaintiff established both close timing and negative statements.
an
to
given
deference
of
the
influence
analysis demonstrates the
employer's reason for taking an adverse action against an employee with

a disability.
Courts often defer to employers regarding their standard of
performance for a particular position or employee, and the court will not
readily question an employer's business judgment as to whether an
employee met those standards. 290 Moreover, courts defer to employers'
judgment that job duties must be completed in a particular way, which
may not be possible given the limitations of the employee's
impairment. 2 91 The legitimacy of the employer's reason for taking an
adverse action is supported by evidence that the plaintiff's deficiencies
were noted or even the reason for discipline before her disability was
revealed.2 92 It is the rare case in which a court will deny summary
judgment for an employer which has presented evidence of a plaintiff's
performance issues, and this typically only occurs where the plaintiff has
presented substantial evidence that those issues are untrue combined with
29 3
harsher treatment compared to similarly situated coworkers.
Some courts defer to employers by allowing them to define a job so
294
For example, by
as to render the person with a disability unqualified.
classifying in-person attendance as an essential part of a job, an employer
can eliminate telework or a flexible schedule as a reasonable
accommodation. 29 5 This deference to employers results in the dismissal
of claims without allowing a jury to determine which aspects of a job are
essential. 2 96 Employers also benefit when courts misclassify personal and
professional qualifications to include the absence of a disability, which
relieves them of the burden of showing that the exclusionary qualification
289.

See supraTable 3.

290. Jacobson v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. 16cv6169, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211312, at *16
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2018); see also White v. Pacifica Found., 973 F. Supp. 2d 363, 382 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (noting that plaintiff did not deny poor performance and could not show that reasons for
termination, including economic recession, were pretextual); see Silva v. Peninsula Hotel, 509 F.

Supp. 2d 364, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that plaintiff did not dispute that he committed various
infractions of employer policies).
291. See Travis, supra note 33, at 1715.

292. Wein v.-N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., No. 18 Civ. 11141, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150136, at
*38 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2020); see also Gray v. Onondaga-Cortland-Madison Bd. of Coop. Educ.
Servs., No. 5:16-Cv-973, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36231, at *22-23 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2020) (finding
that the investigation into conduct began before request for medical leave).

293. Corona v. Clarins U.S.A., Inc., No. 17-cv-4438, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155862, at *21-22
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2019).
294.

Travis, supra note 33, at 1701.

295. Id. at 1715-17.
296. Id. at 1718-19.
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serves a business necessity. 297 This deference and misclassification
"embeds the same disability-based stereotypes that the ADA was intended
to disrupt" leading to the disqualification of many people with disabilities
who could otherwise be accommodated. 298
An employer's legitimate reason for taking an adverse action has
been interpreted so broadly as to even defer to an employer's judgment
that the absence of a disability is an essential job qualification. 2 99 Such
deference undermines the assumption made in other discrimination claims
that one's protected status, such as sex or race, is "irrelevant to job
performance unless the employer proves otherwise." 300 In other words,
courts regularly defer to an employer's opinion about qualifications or
whether the person poses a direct threat even if that employer's
assessment is influenced by stigma or stereotypes related to the person's

disability. 30 1
In rare circumstances, a court will allow a claim to proceed past a
motion for summary judgment where the employer's reason for the
adverse action is especially suspect. 302 For example, an employer's
failure to adhere to its own disciplinary process or failure to document
past performance issues can undermine the legitimacy of that
discipline. 303 Similarly, a motion for summary judgment was denied for
an employer who alleged that the adverse action was taken because of
"job abandonment" combined with past attendance issues, but the
employer had tolerated the plaintiff's attendance pattern for years before
her request for an accommodation. 304
In addition to allegations of poor performance or misconduct,
employers often rely on the direct threat defense to justify the taking of an
adverse action against a person with a disability, based on the employer's
opinion that the person with a disability poses some threat to themselves
or others in the workplace. 305 While the ADA characterizes direct threats
as "defenses to an allegation of discrimination," circuit courts vary on
297. Id. at 1721-23.
298. Id. at 1720.
299. Id. at 1712.
300. Id. at 1713.
301. Id. at 1729.
302. See Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1997).
303. Corona v. Clarins U.S.A., Inc., No. 17-cv-4438, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155862, at *22-23
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2019); see also Lareau v. Nw. Med. Ctr., No. 2:17-cv-81, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
174256, at *6-7 (D. vt. Oct. 8, 2019) (finding that the employer failed to follow its usual, documented
practice of providing employee with written notice before imposing disciplinary action).

304. Torres v. Hilton Int'l of P.R., Inc., No. 10-1190, 2012 U.S.. Dist. LEXIS 91436, at *15-16
(D.P.R. July 2, 2012).
305. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (2011).
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which party carries the burden of proving that a person with a disability
poses a direct threat. 3 06 In theory, this defense requires that the employer
prove that the employee with a disability in fact poses a "direct threat." 307
In reality, raising the direct threat defense forces employees to produce
detailed medical evidence to show the absence of a threat, to survive a
motion for summary judgment. 308 This approach obviates the burden on
the employer to show that the safety standard serves a business
necessity.309
In an early decision addressing whether an employee with a disability
poses a direct threat in the workplace, the Supreme Court stated that a
"belief that a significant risk existed, even if maintained in good faith,
would not relieve" a discriminator from liability for excluding someone
as a "direct threat." 3 10 Similarly, the EEOC has offered the guidance that:
"[t]he determination that an individual poses a "direct threat" shall be
based on an individualized assessment of the individual's present ability
to safely perform the essential functions of the job. This assessment
shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most
current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective
evidence." 3 11

Instead of following the guidance of the Supreme Court and the
EEOC, lower courts have treated the question of whether an employee
poses a direct threat as a question of law which can be decided on a motion
for summary judgment rather than by a jury.312 Many courts often afford
employers significant deference in establishing the direct threat defense,
including basing a finding of direct threat not on medical opinion, but
rather based on the evidence of the employee's behavior. 3 13

306. Id. at 163.
307. EEOC v. Beverage Distribs. Co., LLC, 780 F.3d 1018, 1021-22 (10th Cir. 2015); Osborne
v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 798 F.3d 1260, 1268 (10th Cir. 2015); see, e.g., U.S. EEOC, QUESTIONS
& ANSWERS ABOUT DIABETES IN THE WORKPLACE AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 6,
7 (2013), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/diabetes-workplace-and-ada.
308. Travis, supra note 33, at 1727.

309. Id. at 1728.
310. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998); see also Stragapede v. City of Evanston, No.
12C08879, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7370, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2016) (finding that the employer's
burden to show that employee posed direct threat to workplace safety that could not be eliminated by
reasonable accommodation).

311.
312.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2011).
Michael v. City of Troy Police Dep't, 808 F.3d 304, 307, 309 (6th Cir. 2015).

313. See Jeffrey A. Van Detta, "For the Love of God! Open This Door!": Individual Rights
Versus Public Safety Under the "DirectThreat" Standard of The Americans with DisabilitiesAct
After Three Decades of Litigation, 6 BELMONT L. REv. 147, 190 (2019).
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Under this deference to employers, courts grant a motion for
summary judgment in the employer's favor rather than allowing a fact
finder to independently assess whether the employee poses a direct threat;
instead, a claim is dismissed if the employer's assessment of the threat
was "objectively reasonable" in the employer's opinion. 314 For example,
the Tenth Circuit dismissed the claim of an employee with post-traumatic
stress disorder who was discharged after reacting to physical contact
originating with a coworker, based only on the employer's individualized
assessment of what the employer claimed to be the "best available
objective evidence" that he posed a direct threat, without requiring
support from an "independent medical examination." 3 15 In contrast, only
a small number of courts have required that a direct threat defense be
based on "objective reasonableness of [the employer's] actions," 3 16 as
established by the views of health care professionals, 3 17 and scientific
objectivity. 318
This common deference to an employer's opinion about whether a
person with a disability poses a direct threat is particularly problematic
for people with a mental illness or other stigmatized impairment.3 19
Stereotypes and stigmatization of mentally ill individuals as dangerous
allows for intentional employment discrimination against them based on
employers' concerns about violence in the workplace generally as well as
their potential negligent hiring liability. 320 Instead of relying on stigma
and stereotypes, an employer's conclusion that an employee with a
disability poses a direct threat in the workplace should rely on medical

314. EEOC v. Beverage Distribs. Co., LLC, 780 F.3d 1018, 1021 (10th Cir. 2015).
315. Jarvis v. Potter, 500 F.3d 1113, 1117 (10th Cir. 2007).
316. Nail v. BNSF Ry. Co., 917 F.3d 335, 342 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524
U.S. 624, 650 (1998)).
317. Id. (citing Chevron USA, Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 86 (2002)); Justice v. Crown Cork
& Seal Co., 527 F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (10th Cit. 2008); see also Lowe v. Ala. Power Co., 244 F.3d
1305, 1309 (11th Cir. 2001).
318. See Bums v. Dal-Italia, LLC, No. CIV-13-528-KEW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7564, at * 14
(E.D. Okla. Jan. 22, 2016) (summary judgment denied because of questions of fact as to whether
employer relied on reasonable medical judgment in determining that plaintiff posed direct threat).
319. Travis, supra note 33, at 1729.
320. Kaminer, supra note 1, at 219-21; Edward Diksa & E. Sally Rogers, Employer Concerns
about Hiring Persons with Psychiatric Disability: Results of the Employer Attitude Questionnaire, 40
J. OF AM. REHAB. COUNSELING ASS'N 31, 31 (1996); see also OTTO F. WAHL, TELLING IS RISKY
BUSINESS: MENTAL HEALTH CONSUMERS CONFRONT STIGMA 82 (1999) (stating that "[t]he change
of attitude of interviewers and prospective employers when psychiatric status was disclosed, as well
as the negative outcomes, helped to convince consumers that their psychiatric history ratherthan their
current competence was the basis of job denials."); Jean Campbell, Unintended Consequences in
Public Policy: Persons with Psychiatric Disabilities and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 22

POL'Y STUD. J. (1994).
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evidence, but neither courts nor juries have the medical or scientific
competency to determine whether a person with a disability poses a direct
threat.32 1 Deference to an employer's determination of whether a person
poses a direct threat seems to be the preferred solution to this lack of
knowledge. 322
Courts' deference to employers includes allowing employers to
legitimize adverse actions against employees with disabilities based on
their "good faith belief' that the employee posed a threat, engaged in
misconduct, or performed poorly. 32 3 For a plaintiff with a disability,
324
or that
evidence that her employer's decision was "wrong or mistaken,"
the decision was not "wise, shrewd, prudent or competent" will be
insufficient to establish pretext so as to avoid dismissal on a motion for
summary judgment. 325 As one court explained, "questionable decisionmaking does not equate to pretext." 326
Under this approach, courts have allowed the dismissal of a claim of
discrimination brought by a person with a disability based on the
employer's reasonable belief that the employee or applicant posed a direct
threat. 327 Thus, if an employer can characterize "speculation regarding
future risk of injury as a direct threat to self, then it becomes a valid reason
for disqualification." 328 Even beyond cases involving a direct threat
defense, courts defer to an employer's beliefs regarding an employee's
alleged misconduct. 329 For example, a court dismissed the retaliation
claim of a plaintiff accused of working while he was on leave, based on
that employer's "honest belief' that the plaintiff was evasive in

321.

van Detta, supra note 313, at 154.

322. Id. at 165-66.
323. Merrill v. McCarthy, 184 F. Supp. 3d 221, 244 (E.D.N.C. 2016); Little v. Ill. Dep't of
Revenue, 369 F.3d 1007, 1012 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Trent v. Constellation Energy Grp., Inc., No.
CCB-08-1271, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58260, at *18-19 (D. Md. July 8, 2009) (stating that
"employers are free to rely on allegations of misconduct in making [disciplinary] decisions, so long
as their reliance is reasonable and in good faith."). But see McCullough v. Univ. of Ark. for Med.

Scis., 559 F.3d 855, 862 (8th Cir. 2009) (possible pretext where "[t]he record in support of the
employer's conclusion is .. . so sparse, or the employer's conclusion so implausible.").

324. Harp v. SEPTA, No. 04-2205, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35344, at *12 (E.D. Pa. June 1,
2006).
325. Peterson v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of veterans Affs., No. 20-3244,2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 15517,
at *8 (3d Cir. May 25, 2021).
326. Rumanek v. Indep. Sch. Mgmt., 619 F. App'x 71, 80 (3d Cir. 2015) (affirming jury verdict
in favor of employer).

327. EEOC v. Beverage Distributors Co., 780 F.3d 1018, 1021-22 (10th Cir. 2015); Jarvis v.
Potter, 500 F.3d 1113, 1121-22 (10th Cir. 2007).
328.

van Detta, supra note 313, at 158.

329. Schwendeman v. Marietta City Schs., No. 20-3251, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 39230, at *56, 9 (6th Cit. Dec. 14, 2020).
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responding to the employer's allegations. 330 No proof of actual misuse of
leave was required to avoid dismissal of the claim. 33 1
This honest belief defense, for both assertion of a direct threat and
other employer-generated reasons for taking an adverse action, allows
employers to escape liability for disparate treatment or retaliation if they
can articulate some reason for taking an adverse action against an
employee with a disability, even if that reason is not true. 332 Courts have
consistently held that the falsity of an employer's explanation for an
adverse action is not enough to prove discriminatory intent; 333 instead, the
employee must show the employer did not truly believe that the employee
engaged in the alleged misconduct or poor performance. 334
Consequently, an employee who has suffered an adverse action after
revealing her disability or requesting an accommodation will be unable to
survive a motion for summary judgment even if the employer's reason for
taking that action is not based in reality, so long as the employer professes
its belief in that reason. 335
Courts' reliance on employers' perceptions of whether an employee
fails to meet performance standards or poses a direct threat undermines
the ability of a person with a disability to establish that the decision was
made with discriminatory intent. 336 For example, if an employee reveals
a disability to obtain an accommodation, but the employer perceives that
the employee or applicant cannot perform their duties, has engaged in
misconduct, or poses a direct threat, then that employer can reject or
discharge that employee because of their disability. 33 7 Given this
deference, employees with disabilities are forced to produce evidence of
pretext to survive a motion for summary judgment. 338

330. Id. at *10-11.
331. Id. at * 12-13.
332. Id. at *14.
333. Stefanidis v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-971, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26133,
at *17-18 (D. Conn. Mar. 2, 2016); see also Kolesnikow v. Hudson valley Hosp. Ctr., 622 F. Supp.
2d 98, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (stating that termination is justified if employer made a good-faith
business determination, regardless of whether employer reached a correct conclusion in attributing

fault to plaintiff); Roge v. NYP Holdings Inc., 257 F.3d 164, 169 (2d Cir. 2001) (lawful for employer
to base termination on good faith belief that employee recently engaged in fraud relating to
employment, whether or not fraud actually occurred).

334.

Pulczinski v. Trinity Structural Towers, Inc., 691 F.3d 996, 1003 (8th Cir. 2012).

335.

van Detta, supra note 313, at 158.

336. Natasha T. Martin, Pretext in Peril, 75 Mo. L. REV. 313, 356 (2010).
337. Id. at 321-23.
338. Id. at 323.
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E. DiscountingEvidence of Pretext Leads to Dismissal
Even if an employee with a disability can establish a prima face claim
of disparate treatment or retaliation based on her revelation of a disability
and/or a request for accommodation, the claim will still be dismissed
unless that employee invalidates the employer's legitimate reason for an
adverse action by showing that the reason proffered by the employer was
a pretext for unlawful discrimination. 339 If a plaintiff provides sufficient
evidence to raise a credible question of pretext, the claim should be
referred to a jury rather than being dismissed on a motion for summary
judgment. 34 0 To survive a motion for summary judgment, however, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that a jury could reasonably doubt or reject her
employer's legitimate reason and infer that her disability or protected
activity was the "but-for" cause of the adverse action. 34 1
Pretext can be established by facts that could convince a jury to "(1)
disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe
that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a
342
In
motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action."
determining whether the employer's reason was the true explanation for
the adverse action, 343 the court evaluates the plaintiff's evidence
supporting a future jury's rejection of the employer's explanation for the
adverse action. This evaluation includes significant deference afforded to
that employer's judgment, as described above. 344 Moreover, this
requirement on the employer to legitimize its action is light, and the
plaintiff bears the "ultimate burden of proving that she has been the victim
of intentional discrimination." 345 Under this standard, courts often
dismiss a claim on a motion for summary judgment without allowing a

339.

St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 516-18 (1993) ("inquiry now turns from the

few generalized factors that establish a prima facie case to the specific proofs and rebuttals of
discriminatory motivation the parties have introduced"); Ferrari v. Ford Motor Co., 826 F.3d 885, 892

(6th Cir. 2016).
340. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147-48 (2000).
341. Upshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 576 F.3d 576, 586 (6th Cir. 2009); see also Hersko v. Wilson,
No. 3:15-cv-215, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119573, at *4344 (S.D. Ohio July 18, 2018) (dismissing
claim without reason to disbelieve that adverse action was taken based on record of absenteeism).

342. Wright v. Providence Care Ctr., LLC, 822 F. App'x 85, 91 (3d Cir. 2020); West v.
Northampton Clinic Co., 783 F. App'x 118, 122 (3d Cir. 2019); Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n of
Se. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 668 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Zabinski, supra note 189, at 285; Martin, supra
note 336, at 326.
343. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 14849; Grose v. Lew, No. 15-5357, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 24454, at
*17 (6th Cir. Sept. 21, 2016).
344. See supra notes 216-41 and accompanying text.
345. Smith v. Strayer Univ. Corp., 79 F. Supp. 3d 591, 599 (E.D. Va. 2015).
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jury to determine whether the plaintiff has introduced sufficient facts to
support their finding that the employer acted with discriminatory intent. 346
Beyond the employer's lack of honest belief in the reason discussed
above, 347 a plaintiff can attempt to show that the employer's reasons "did
not actually motivate the employer's action," or that the reason was
"insufficient to motivate the employer's action." 34 8 Circumstantial
evidence of pretext can include "weaknesses, implausibilities,
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions" in the employer's
proffered legitimate reasons, so as to permit a jury to infer the employer's
discriminatory intent. 349 Plaintiffs typically rely on a relationship
between the adverse action and (1) negative statements by their employer
and/or (2) the timing of the revelation of their disability or their protected
activity.35 0 Employees with disabilities may also establish pretext by
showing that similarly situated, able-bodied employees were treated more
favorably, 35 1 but this method is difficult because of the unique
circumstances surrounding most claims by employees with disabilities.
Without such evidence from the plaintiff, courts will dismiss a claim of
disparate treatment or retaliation on a summary judgment motion. 35 2
1.

Negative Statements as Evidence of Pretext

Negative statements about a plaintiff's disability or protected activity
can sometimes establish pretext, much like racial or sex-related comments
can establish pretext under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 353 For
example, a supervisor's comments about a plaintiff's absences, indicating
his dislike of people with disabilities combined with references to a
plaintiffs need for physical therapy, helped to defeat an employer's
motion for summary judgment regarding the plaintiffs subsequent

346. See, e.g., Id. at 602 (dismissing harassment and hostile work environment claim for failure
to produce sufficient evidence of subjective and objective discrimination).
347. See supra notes 339-52 and accompanying text

348. Sands v. Brennan, No. 18-2186, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 7530, at *4-5 (6th Cir. Mar. 13,
2019); Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394, 394 (6th Cir. 2009).
349. Palencar v. N.Y. Power Auth., 834 F. App'x 647, 651 (2d Cir. 2020) (retaliation); Kwan v.
Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 846 (2d Cir. 2013) (disparate treatment); Castellani v. Bucks Co.
Mun., 351 F. App'x 774, 777 (3d Cir. 2009).
350. See, e.g., Kwan, 737 F.3d at 847 (temporal proximity); Patten v. Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc.,
300 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2002) (statements about disability).
351. See Martin, supra note 336, at 323, 333, 345.
352. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000).
353.

See, e.g., Charlotte S. Alexander et al., Post-RacialHydraulics:The Hidden Dangersof the

Universal Turn, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 15 (2016).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2021

45

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 2

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAWJOURNAL

46

[Vol.
[3 39:1

discharge. 354 As one court noted, however, admissions of an employer's
discriminatory or retaliatory motive are rare, "for obvious reasons." 355
After almost thirty years of ADA coverage, employers likely avoid such
open expressions of discriminatory intent. Therefore, given the awareness
of potential discrimination claims among managers and supervisors, proof
of such blatant statements may be unobtainable even if a supervisor holds
such discriminatory attitudes. 356
Even though such discriminatory statements are unusual, our review
of ADA claims reveals that without specific negative statements by the
employer's decision maker, the plaintiff will likely fail to defeat a motion
for summary judgment. 357 However, evidence of such statements is not a
guarantee to reach a jury.
3 58
TABLE 4. Influence of Negative Statements

Acceptance
of Employer

Statements
& Close

Rejection of
Employer

Timing,
Statements

Relevant
Statements

Reason &
Statements

Timing but
Employer
Reason

Reason &
Statements

Rejection of
Employer's
Reason

&

Close
Timing &

Accepted
For
Employee
(48)

8

0

0

6

12

For
Employer
(96)

0

4

3

0

0

Success

8/8

0/4

0/3

6/6

12/12

Rate for

Plaintiffs

The limited impact of negative statements is demonstrated in our
review of 143 court decisions. 359 None of those decisions relied on
negative statements about the plaintiff's disability or protected activity
alone. 36 0 Instead, negative statements related to the plaintiff's disability

354. Murphy v. N.Y. State Pub. Emp. Fed'n, No. 1:17-cv-628, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152908,
at *3740 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2019).
355. Cloe v. City of Indianapolis, 712 F.3d 1171, 1180 (7th Cir. 2013).
356. See Martin, supra note 336, at 315, 317, 320.
357. See infra Table 4.
358. See infra Appendix A.
359. See infra Appendix A.
360. See infra Appendix A.
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and/or protected activity supported a denial of summary judgment where
the plaintiff was able to produce other evidence of pretext, such as the
temporal proximity of the adverse action or some reason for the court to
reject the legitimacy of the employer's reason for the adverse action.3 61
Employers had success in four cases where the court accepted their
reason for the adverse action, even if the plaintiff submitted evidence of
negative statements related to their disability or protected activity, and in
three of those cases the plaintiff even established both close timing and
negative statements. 362
The lack of influence of negative statements stems in part from the
restrictive view of their relevance. In our review of decisions, eight out
of 96 decisions for employers were dismissed in part because an
employer's negative statements were deemed unrelated to the plaintiff's
disability or protected activity; three were dismissed in part because
statements were not made by a decision maker for the employer; two were
dismissed where the statements were deemed unrelated and by a nondecision maker; and seven out of ninety-six decisions for employers were
based in part on the court's determination that the negative statements
were unrelated to the adverse action taken.
As seen in our review, a negative statement about the plaintiff is only
sufficient to avoid summary judgment when four factors related to the
context demonstrate the employer's discriminatory intent: when the
negative statement was made by a decision maker or some other
supervisor or manager, in connection to the disparate treatment being
challenged, and the content and context of the comment support an
inference of the employer's discriminatory intent. 363 Thus, courts only
consider statements with an obvious connection to a plaintiff's disability
or request for accommodation. 364
Consequently, negative statements will only support a denial of
summary judgment where "[a] jury can infer a causal connection between
the alleged adverse employment action and the protected activity based
on certain remarks made by Defendants." 365 For example, two plaintiffs
avoided dismissal when they had been referenced as "handicapped,"

361.

See infra Appendix A.

362.

See supra Table 4.

363. Henry v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., 616 F.3d 134, 149 (2d Cir. 2010).
364. See generally Patten v. Wal-Mart Stores E., Inc., 300 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2002) (discussing
the need for direct evidence of "statements by a decisionmaker that directly reflect the alleged animus
and bear squarely on the contested employment decision.").

365. Schmitt v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-05992, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187382, at *26
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2018).
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"hospital people," "retarded," and "stupid." 36 6 Similarly, one court sent
a claim to a jury based on disability-related comments about an employee
who had used leave because of his disability, even though the statements
were made six months before the employee's discharge, where the
supervisor told him that he was there to get rid of "the old, the sick, the
people taking a lot of time out from work." 3 67
Given these limitations, in rare cases the negative, disability-related
statements by a decision maker may help to prevent the dismissal of a
claim on a motion for summary judgment. 368 In one case, comments
made at a meeting where the plaintiff was informed of the adverse action
to be taken, combined with the temporal proximity of that meeting to her
return to work after leave for her disability, sufficed to defeat that
employer's motion for summary judgment.3 69 In a second decision,
comments about the plaintiff's disability and negative comments on her
performance evaluation for taking FMLA leave (even though they were
made fourteen months before her termination), combined with treating the
plaintiff more harshly than similarly situated coworkers, was sufficient to
avoid dismissal of a claim for retaliation. 370 These examples illustrate the
limited circumstances in which disability-related negative statements can
prevent dismissal of a claim.
In contrast, more general derogatory statements about an employee
with a disability may be insufficient to establish pretext. 37 1 For example,
statements that the plaintiff "is always trying to do something. She's
nothing but a troublemaker," have been deemed to be unrelated to a
disability involving asthma and allergies for which she had sought
accommodations. 3 72 Similarly, remarks that relate to the plaintiff's

366. EEOC v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., No. 2:17-Cv-73, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167382, at *11-14
(N.D.W. va. Sept. 27, 2018).
367. Darosa v. Admiral Packaging, Inc., No. 16-485 WES, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74874, at
*16-17 (D.R.I. May 2, 2019).
368. See Primmer v. CBS Studios, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 2d 248, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Merendo v.
Ohio Gastroenterology Grp., Inc., No. 2:17-cv-817, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31507, at *59-60 (S.D.
Ohio Feb. 27, 2019).
369. See Primmer, 667 F. Supp. 2d at 261.
370. See Merendo, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31507, at *59-60.
371. Evans v. Capital Blue Cross, No. 1:19-Cv-497, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40267 at *27-28
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2021). See generally Martin, supra note 336, at 348-49 (discussing the "stray
remarks" doctrine).

372. Evans v. Capital Blue Cross, No. 1:19-Cv-497, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40267 at *27-28
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2021).
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behavior rather than her disability, such as "weird" and "creepy," may be
insufficient to support a finding of discriminatory intent. 373
The influence of negative statements is limited in avoiding dismissal
of disparate treatment claims, even where the statements are clearly
disability-related. 3 74 Derogatory comments concerning a plaintiff's
disability or protected activity typically may only establish pretext if those
comments have some temporal or causal connection to the allegedly
discriminatory adverse action. 37 5 If the timing of disability-related
remarks predates the adverse action so as to be considered "stray
remarks," those statements will not necessarily prevent dismissal of a
claim. 376 For example, one court found that "a three-month lapse between
alleged discriminatory statements and an adverse employment action is
too long a gap to find the remark probative of discrimination." 3 77
Even disability-related statements may be insufficient to avoid
summary judgment for the employer if the employer offers other reasons
for the adverse action. 3 78 For example, the Third Circuit recently affirmed
the dismissal of a claim of discrimination brought by a nurse who missed
work due to her cancer, who alleged that she was not chosen for several
positions because of her disability. 379 Even though her supervisor had
referenced her recent use of leave in explaining her rejection for those
positions, summary judgment was granted based in part on the employer's

373. Auble v. Babcock & wilcox Tech. Servs. Y-12, LLC, No. 3:13-CV-422-TAV-HBG, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140868, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 15, 2015).
374.

See infra notes 378-80.

375. See Laurin v. Providence Hosp., 150 F.3d 52, 58 (1st Cir. 1998); see also Patten v. WalMart Stores E., Inc., 300 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that direct evidence of discrimination
excludes "mere background noise" and "stray remarks"); Duryea v. MetroCast Cablevision of N.H.,

LLC, No. 15-cv-164-LM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60841, at *32-33 (D.N.H. Apr. 21, 2017) (holding
that pretext was not established by comments by supervisors who did not decide to discharge

plaintiff).
376. See Langella v. Mahopac Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 18-cv-10023, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95588,
at *29 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2020) (disability-related remarks made a year before adverse action in a

different context); Luka v. Bard College, 263 F. Supp. 3d 478, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (showing
disability-related remarks were made three years before adverse action being challenged); Moore v.

Verizon, No. 13-cv-6467, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16201, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2016) (showing that
remarks made one year prior to termination were not related to decision to terminate).

377. Sethi v. Narod, 12 F. Supp. 3d 505, 540 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); see also Callistro v. Cabo, No.
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11176, at *20-21 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2013) (holding that the

I1-CV-2897,

remarks were too attenuated where one remark was made at least one month before discussion of
adverse action and the other remark was made at beginning of her employment).

378. See Yingst v. Coatesville Hosp. Co., LLC, No. 20-2960, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 20822, at
*3-4, 9-11 (3d Cir. July 14, 2021).
379. See id. at *34.
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perception that the plaintiff did not perform well during the interview for
one of those positions.380
In addition to some temporal connection, negative, disability-related
comments typically will not defeat a motion for summary judgment if
those comments were not made by a decision maker in connection with
the adverse action taken. 38 1 In a perfect example of a plaintiff's difficulty
in surviving a motion for summary judgment, a court recognized that a
supervisor's reference to management's concern about the plaintiff's use
of leave because of his disability, shortly before his discharge, was
sufficient to support a prima facie claim of disparate treatment when it
was evident that this same "management" made the decision to discharge
the plaintiff.382 However, that same court went on to conclude that those
statements were insufficient evidence of pretext, even though they were
directly related to the plaintiff's use of disability leave, because the
383
plaintiff was not discharged until after she returned from leave.
Evidence of discriminatory intent on the part of a supervisor,
connected with the plaintiff's disclosure of her disability, can establish an
employer's discriminatory intent so as to avoid summary judgment under
a "cat's paw" theory of liability.3 84 Under this theory, discriminatory
intent may be established under Title VII where a decision maker,
regarding the adverse action taken, was influenced by a biased
subordinate,385 particularly where that decision maker failed to undertake

380. See id at *9-11.
381. See Laurin v. Providence Hosp., 150 F.3d 52, 58 (1st Cir. 1998); see, e.g., Preston v. Bristol
Hosp., 645 F. App'x17, 22 (2d Cir. 2016) (comments not related to discharge by person who was not
a decision maker); see also Harvin v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth., No. 14-

CV-5125, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56759, at *30 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2018) (disability-related
comments were not made by a decision maker).

382.

Clark v. Jewish Childcare Ass'n, 96 F. Supp. 3d 237, 253-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding that

the remark directly related to use of leave for disability was made shortly before discharge).

383. See id at 257.
384. See Natofsky v. City of New York, 921 F.3d 337, 350 (2d Cir. 2019); see also Staub v.
Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 415 n.1 (2011) (demonstrating an action brought under USERRA);
Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Serv., Inc., 835 F.3d 267,272 (2d Cir. 2016) (exemplifying an action
brought under Title VII); Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 143 (2d Cir. 2008) (showing another
action brought under Title VII).
385. See Bourara v. N.Y. Hotel Trades Council & Hotel Ass'n of N.Y.C., No. 17cv7895, 2020
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159371, at *27-28 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2020); see also Murphy v. N.Y.S. Pub.
Employ. Fed., No. 1:17-cv-628, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152908, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2019)
(holding that a jury could find that the person who made disability-related statements played an
"important role" in adverse action decision).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol39/iss1/2

50

Hickox and Stevelinck: Denial of Jury Trials for Employees with Disabilities: The High B

2021 ]

HIGHBAR OF PROVING DISCRIMINATORY INTENT

51

any independent investigation regarding the legitimacy of the reason for
the adverse action taken. 38 6
Under this approach, a plaintiff with a disability survived a motion
for summary judgment by an employer, the discriminatory intent of which
was established by the discriminatory attitude of the supervisor who was
aware of the plaintiff's disability and influenced the decision maker for
the employer. 3 87 This theory can be important for employees with
disabilities who have disclosed their disability to a supervisor, who then
passes that information along to another supervisor or manager who
decides to take some adverse action against that employee, but alleges that
he or she did not have knowledge of that employee's disability. 3 88 In
nineteen of the ninety-six decisions in favor of employers in our review,
the employer alleged that the decision maker lacked knowledge of the
plaintiff's disability or protected activity until after making the decision
to take an adverse action.3 89
Surprisingly, plaintiffs were unable to avoid dismissal of their claims
in many cases even where disability-related statements suggested an
employer's discriminatory intent. Consequently, plaintiffs with
disabilities will struggle to survive a motion for summary judgment which
alleges a lack of connection between their disability and the adverse action
they have experienced. 39 0 In determining the weight to afford to
disability-related statements on a motion for summary judgment, courts
reviewing claims of disparate treatment and retaliation should consider
386. See Geras v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist.,

149

F. Supp. 3d 300, 328-29 (E.D.N.Y.

2015) (holding that a person harboring racial bias had a "singular influence" or "dominated" the
ultimate decision maker); see also Back v. Hastings Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 126 (2d Cir.
2004) (vacating grant of summary judgment in gender discrimination claim where deciding board
was influenced by evaluation of employee's performance by others with bias without making

independent inquiry); Zagaja v. vill. Freeport, No. 10cv-3660, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79668, at *427 (E.D.N.Y. June 3, 2013) (denying dismissal of a retaliation claim where person with retaliatory
motive had meaningful role in adverse action decision); Casseus v. Verizon, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 2d

326, 351-52 n.20 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying dismissal of discrimination claim based on evidence of
deference to biased person); Mugavero v. Arms Acres, Inc., No. 03 civ. 05724, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
30431, at *63 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009) (finding summary judgment improper where person with
retaliatory motive "played a meaningful role in the decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment.").

But see McLean v. Metro. Jewish Geriatric Ctr., No. 1 I-CV-3065, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152377, at
*9 n.8 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2013) (holding that a supervisor with final authority based adverse
employment action exclusively on "independent evaluation."); Baron v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No.

06-CV-2816, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57515, at *22-23 (E.D.N.Y. July 7, 2009) (finding that the
employer's decision was based on evaluation of performance by several individuals beyond person
who expressed ageist views).

387.
388.
389.
390.

See Bourara, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159371, at *28.
See id. at *19-21.
See infra Appendix A.
See Bourara,2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159371, at *29.
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the approach of courts reviewing hostile work environment claims by
employees with disabilities.
Some harassment-related statements prevent dismissal even if they
For example, a
do not refer directly to a person's disability. 39 1
supervisor's disability-related statements to an employee established the
requisite causation in a hostile environment claim by telling the employee
to go home, take medication and see a psychiatrist. 3 92 In some hostile
work environment claims, causation can be established even though the
harassers may lack specific information about the target's medical
condition. 393 For example, a target of harassment survived a motion for
summary judgment where the target told his harassers about his symptoms
and that he suffered from "medical issues" and "ailments." 394 Similarly,
causation was established by a harasser's use of "disability-specific and
derogatory terms" showing that the harassment was motivated by the
target's disability. 395 This court also noted that more neutral insults could
be deemed connected to the target's disability if that harassment began
after the target revealed his disability to the harasser. 396
If an employer's supervisor or manager exhibits a discriminatory or
retaliatory attitude through their negative statements, courts should at a
minimum allow a jury to determine the significance of those statements
in determining whether the employer acted with intent consistent with
those statements. Placing limitations on the relevance of such statements
so as to remove claims from a jury's consideration places inappropriate
barriers to disparate treatment and retaliation claims by employees with

disabilities. 397
2.

Temporal Proximity as Proof of Pretext

For an employer whose supervisors and managers are savvy enough
to avoid making negative, discriminatory statements, plaintiffs often rely
on the timing of the adverse action they suffered after revealing their

391. See Mlinarchik v. Brennan, No. 3:16-cv-257, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174037, at *9-10
(W.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2018).
392. Id.
393. See, e.g., Schmitt v. City of New York, No. 15-Cv-05992, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187382,
at *17-18 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2018).
394. Id.
395. Mashni v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, No. 15C10951, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141706,
at *29 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2017).
396. Id. at *30.
397. See id.
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disability or requesting an accommodation. 398 For example, one court
refused to grant a motion for summary judgment filed against an
employee with epilepsy where the school employing him as a custodian
imposed unjustified, disproportionate discipline three months after his
revelation of his disability.399 This decision, which also relied on the
court's skepticism of the plaintiff's performance as justification for the
adverse action,4 00 exemplifies the principle that to demonstrate pretext,
"plaintiff[s] may rely on evidence comprising [their] prima facie case,
including temporal proximity, together with other evidence such as
inconsistent employer explanations, to defeat summary judgment at that
stage." 4 0 1
This principle means that temporal proximity may only be sufficient
to establish pretext for discrimination or retaliation if the employer fails
402
to provide a sufficient legitimate reason for the adverse action.
Conversely, if an employer offers any reason for the adverse action,
temporal proximity alone is "insufficient to demonstrate a pretext." 403 For

398.

See Nash v. HomeGoods, Inc., No. 16-cv-1043, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55151, at *27-29

(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2019) (employer began adverse treatment for disputed reasons shortly after

revelation of disability); McNulty v. City of Warren, No. 1:16-CV-843, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
36591, at *46 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2019) (pretext established by person with disability who was
subjected to heightened scrutiny shortly after returning from leave); Vale v. Great Neck Water

Pollution Control Dist., 80 F. Supp. 3d 426, 437 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (employer began taking adverse
action shortly after plaintiff's injury even though termination did not occur for more than two years).

399. Karatzas v. Herricks Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 15-cv-2888, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
112397, at *61-3 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2017).
400. Id. at *66-7.
401. Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 847 (2d Cir. 2013).
402. Baron v. Advanced Asset & Prop. Mgm't Sols., 15 F. Supp. 3d 274, 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
403. Parks v. UPS Supply Chain Sols., Inc., 607 F. App'x 508, 517 (6th Cir. 2015); see also
Powell v. Merrick Acad. Charter Sch., No. 16-CV-5315, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32810, at *20-21
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2018) (temporal proximity of less than one month insufficient to survive motion
for summary judgment where pleadings established other legitimate reason for adverse action);

Mancini v. Accredo Health Grp., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 243, 253-54 (D. Conn. 2019) (claim dismissed
on summary judgment despite temporal proximity and factual issues regarding truth of employer's
reasons for adverse action); Kieffer v. CPR Restoration & Cleaning Serv., LLC, 733 F. App'x 632,

638-39 (3d Cir. 2018); Francis v. Namdor, Inc., No. 15CV745, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134251, at *89 (E.D.N.Y Aug. 22, 2017) (temporal proximity does not prevent dismissal where employer provides
a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for adverse action); Trent v. Town of Brookhaven, 966 F.

Supp. 2d 196, 206 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (granting summary judgment where "Plaintiff's only evidence
disputing Defendant's evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason is the temporal proximity

of particular events and speculation."); El Sayed v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 627 F.3d 931, 933 (2d Cir.
2010) ("temporal proximity is insufficient to satisfy [a plaintiff's] burden to bring forward some
evidence of pretext."); Iverson v. Verizon Communications, No. 08 Civ. 8873, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
96117, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2009) ("Merely claiming temporal proximity between the disclosure
of disability and termination, however, is not enough to show that [employer's] reasons for
termination were a pretext for discrimination."); Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 141 (2d Cir.
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example, one court's opinion included no discussion of pretext when an
employer's performance-based justification for discharge just thirteen
days after learning of an employee's disability was accepted by the
court. 404 Similarly, a second court failed to discuss the significance of
temporal proximity as evidence of pretext when, based on the court's
acceptance of a doctor's tardiness as justification for dismissal, an
employer was permitted to discharge an employee with a disability within
405
days of his request for accommodations.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of this second disparate
treatment claim because "temporal proximity cannot be the sole basis for
finding pretext" once the employer has offered other legitimate reasons
for the adverse action. 406 While the court noted that the temporal
proximity was sufficient for a prima facie claim of retaliation, the court
dismissed the claim absent additional evidence of pretext in light of the
employer's other substantiated reasons for the discharge, which were
documented by warnings. 4 07
These decisions demonstrate that a plaintiff who reveals her
disability or requests an accommodation for that disability can only rely
on a very short time frame to establish a prima facie claim of disparate
treatment based on temporal proximity. 408 Even if that timing is
sufficiently close to establish a prima facie claim, it may be insufficient to
establish the employer's pretext to discriminate if the employer offers
some other legitimate reason for its adverse action. 409 This approach
essentially nullifies the temporal connection between an employee's
revelation of their disability or request for accommodation and the adverse
4 10
action they suffer shortly thereafter.

2008) (given employer's evidence that it acted for nonadiscriminatory reasons, "[plaintiff] may no
longer rely on the presumption of discrimination raised by the prima facie case.").

404. Mishak v. Serazin, No. 1:17Cv1543, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185625, at *16-17, 48-50
(N.D. Ohio Oct. 30. 2018).
405. Keogh v. Concenta Corp., No. 16-CV-11460, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170535, at *8-11
(E.D. Mi. Oct. 16, 2017), aff'd 752 F. App'x 316 (6th Cir. 2018).
406. Keogh, 752 F. App'x at 324-25.
407. Id.; see also Sukari v. Akebono Brake Corp., No. 18-10987,2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127177,
at *14-15 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 2019) (summary judgment in favor of employer justifying discharge
based on plaintiff's attendance issues and belief in plaintiff's misuse of vacation days, despite
temporal proximity).

408. Mishak, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185625, at *16-17; Keogh, 752 F. App'x at 324-25; Sukari,
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127177, at *14-15.
409. Mishak, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185625, at *1 6-17; Keogh, 752 F. App'x at 324-25; Sukari,
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127177, at *14-15.
410. Mishak, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185625, at *16-17; Keogh, 752 F. App'x at 324-25; Sukari,
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127177, at *14-15.
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As with claims of disparate treatment, in claims of retaliation,
temporal proximity typically fails to defeat a motion for summary
judgment where the employer has offered some legitimate reason for its
adverse action. 411 For example, temporal proximity between a plaintiff's
protected activity and an adverse action was insufficient to prove
retaliation where the employer already had plans to implement an adverse
action prior to the plaintiff's protected activity.4 12
Although often insufficient by itself, temporal proximity generally
may be combined with other evidence of pretext to survive a motion for
summary judgment regarding a claim of retaliation. 4 13 In a very narrow
range of decisions, plaintiffs with disabilities were able to rely on
temporal proximity as evidence of pretext to defeat a motion for summary
judgment. 4 14 The Sixth Circuit provided a path for plaintiffs to survive a
motion for summary judgment by refusing to dismiss the claim of a
plaintiff discharged shortly after he engaged in protected activity under
Title VII, and where the employer only offered "inconsistent explanations
for her termination." 4 15 For example, a police officer plaintiff was able to
survive a motion for summary judgment where he alleged that the
retaliatory adverse actions occurred within four months of his request for
an accommodation and two weeks after he complained about a hostile
work environment, where his supervisor had also made derogatory

411. El Sayed v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 627 F.3d 931, 933 (2d Cir. 2010) (plaintiff must produce
"evidence other than temporal proximity in support of [a] charge that the proffered reason for [their]
discharge was pretextual.").

412. Mishak, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185625, at *70-71; see also Langella v. Mahopac Cent.
Sch. Dist., No. 18-cv-10023, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95588, at *32 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2020)
(showing that investigation began before protected activity); Wang v. Palmisano, 157 F. Supp. 3d

306, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (FLSA retaliation claim dismissed despite close temporal proximity where
employer's conduct began before employee's protected activity); Varughese v. Mount Sinai Med.

Ctr., No. 12-Civ.-8812, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43758, at *174 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2015) (Title VII
retaliation claim dismissed where adverse actions were part of employer's "course of conduct that
began well before any protected activity took place.").

413. Kwan v. Andalex Grp., LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 847 (2d Cir. 2013) (retaliation under Title VII);
see also Raniola v. Bratton, 243 F.3d 610, 625 (2d Cir. 2001) (detailing that retaliatory intent may be
shown by sufficient proof to rebut employer's reason for discharge); James v. N.Y. Racing Ass'n,

233 F.3d 149, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2000) (evidence of falsity of employer's reason for adverse action "may
or may not be sufficient" to sustain claim of retaliation).

414. Kwan, 737 F.3d at 847; Lewis v. Univ. of Pa., No. 16-5874, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13423, at *23 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2018) aff'd in relevant part, 779 F. App'x 920 (3d Cir. 2019); House
v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex., LLC, No. EP-16-CV-408-PRM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128979, at *20-21
(W.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2017).
415. Kwan, 737 F.3d at 847.
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comments about his medical condition during that time. 4 16 This approach
applied under Title VII should be expanded to protect employees with
disabilities who have suffered an adverse action shortly after revealing a
disability or engaging in a protected activity, such as requesting an
accommodation.
These decisions demonstrate a fairly simple solution for employers
seeking to avoid a claim of disparate treatment or retaliation after an
employee has revealed a disability and/or requested an accommodation:
wait one or two months, avoid any negative disability-related statements,
and then proceed with any adverse action based merely on the employer's
belief that some justification exists. 4 17 With such a relatively minor delay,
the employee with a disability would need to produce additional evidence
of the employer's discriminatory or retaliatory intent to survive a motion
for summary judgment.4 18
3. Limited Influence of Other Evidence of Pretext
Beyond reliance on disability-related statements or temporal
proximity, a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment or retaliation under the
ADA may be able to survive a motion for summary judgment by
challenging the legitimacy of the employer's reason for taking an adverse
action.4 19 In rare circumstances, summary judgment may be avoided by
directly questioning the employer's honest belief in its reason for the
adverse action.4 20 In our review, such a challenge led to a trial for three
plaintiffs out of forty-eight who successfully challenged a motion for
summary judgment or motion to dismiss. 4 2 1 For example, a plaintiff who
had requested accommodations less than three months before his
416. Lewis, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13423, at *23. But see House, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
128979, at *20-21 (four months between accommodation request and discharge undermines claim of
retaliation).

417. Mishak, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185625, at *16-17; Keogh v. Concerta Corp., No. 16-CV11460, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170535, at *324-25 (E.D. Mi. Oct. 16, 2017), aff'd 752 F. App'x 316
(6 th Cir. 2018); Sukari v. Akebono Brake Corp., No. 18-10987, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127177, at
*14-15 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 2019); Langella, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95588, at *20-21; Wang, 157
F. Supp. 3d at 327; Varughese, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43758, at *112-13.
418. Mishak, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185625, at *16-17; Keogh, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170535,
at *324-25; Sukari, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127177, at *14-15 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 2019); Langella,
2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95588, at *20-21; Wang, 157 F. Supp. 3d at 327; Varughese, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 43758, at *112-13.
419. See Singh v. vanderbilt Univ. Med. Ctr., No 3:17-cv-00400, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7713,
at *31-32 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 16, 2020); Taylor v. Seamen's Soc'y for Child., No. 112 Civ. 3713, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176914, at *41 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2013).
420. Singh, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7713, at *31-32.
421. See infra Appendix A.
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discharge was able to survive a motion for summary judgment where the
performance issues relied upon by the employer to justify his discharge
occurred seven months before his discharge. 422 This timing suggested to
the court that the performance issues were not significant enough to
support the discharge decision. 423
Beyond asserting that the reason for adverse action simply is not true,
plaintiffs can rely on a comparison between their adverse action and the
adverse actions taken by the same employer against other employees.4 24
Generally, a plaintiff alleging discrimination must establish that those
comparable employees were in a situation sufficiently similar to the
plaintiff's to support an inference that the difference of treatment may be
attributable to discrimination. 425 Under the "but-for" standard, that
plaintiff can defeat a motion for summary judgment by proving that "the
employer treated other, similarly situated persons not of his protected
class more favorably., 42 6 The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating
that a putative comparator is similarly situated "in all material
respects."4 27
To be similarly situated to another employee, a plaintiff will only be
able to establish pretext based on more favorable treatment of co-workers
who were (1) "subject to the same performance evaluation and discipline
standards" and (2) "engaged in comparable conduct." 428 It should be
noted that in general, the existence of employees who are similarly
situated is ordinarily a question of fact; but "if there are many
distinguishing factors between plaintiff and the comparators, the court
may conclude as a matter of law that they are not similarly situated." 429

422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.

Singh, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7713, at *31-32.
Id
Taylor, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176914, at *41.
Id.
Frost v. City of Philadelphia, 839 F. App'x 752, 757 (3d Cir. 2021).
See Bennett v. Verizon Wireless, No. 04-CV-6314 CJS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5373, *4

(W.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2008) (dismissing claim on post-trial motion for reconsideration); see also

Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000) (showing Title VII claim of race
discrimination). But see White v. Home Depot Inc., No. 04-CV-401, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4294,
at *10-11 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2008) (showing Title VII claim not dismissed based on more favorable
treatment of similarly situated coworkers seeking promotion).

428. Graham, 230 F.3d at 40.
429. Watson v. Geithner, No. 09-CV-6624, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139673, at *28 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 27,2013); see also Sosa v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 368 F. Supp. 3d 489, 514-15 (E.D.N.Y. 2019)
(granting motion to dismiss where plaintiff failed to allege factual details relevant to allegation that
other similarly situated employees were treated more favorably); Abel v. N.Y.C. Hum. Res. Admin.,

No. 10-CV-0295, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23780, at * 17-18 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2011) (dismissing ADA
claims where plaintiff failed to identify any nondisabled comparators); Fox v. State Univ. of N.Y.,
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For example, summary judgment was granted where the comparators put
forth by the plaintiff alleging discrimination under Title VII had worked
for the employer for more years than the plaintiff had. 430
Likewise, one court dismissed the claim of an employee challenging
his dismissal as pretextual when other employees were not discharged for
similar absences because the plaintiff failed to present evidence of the
reasons for the proposed comparators' unauthorized absences, their
opportunity to offer a proper explanation or excuse for their absences,
whether they were disciplined in some other way, and whether their
supervisor was the same. 431 These decisions demonstrate the heavy
burden on an employee to establish that a coworker engaged in the same
behavior or performed in the same way and yet was treated differently. 4 32
This demonstration of similarity becomes nearly impossible for an
employee with a disability that affects their performance or behavior,
given the small likelihood that another employee working for the same
4 33
supervisor also has a similar disability affecting their performance.
In rare cases, a plaintiff with a disability may establish questions of
fact based on more favorable treatment of other similarly situated
employees. 434 For example, a doctor with a disability was able to defeat
her employer's motion for summary judgment based on the employer's
reasons for her discharge, including tardiness, refusal to cover for other
doctors, and "behavioral issues," in large part because those reasons were
either untrue or her behavior was less severe than similar conduct by other
doctors. 435 Similarly, the employer's failure to discharge other similarly
situated employees for comparable performance issues helped to defeat a
motion for summary judgment against a plaintiff who claimed both
disparate treatment and retaliation after his discharge, which occurred the
day after informing his employer that he needed surgery. 436
Like disparate treatment of similarly situated employees, an
employer's failure to adhere to its own policies or procedures can, in rare

686 F. Supp. 2d 225, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (dismissing disability discrimination claim where plaintiff
failed to name any similarly situated nondisabled comparators who were treated differently).

430. Tillman v. Luray's Travel, 137 F. Supp. 3d 315, 332 n.12 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
431. Novick v. vill. of Wappingers Falls, 376 F. Supp. 3d 318, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
432. See id. at 341.
433. See generally id. at 343 (explaining cases where employees had difficulty demonstrating
another employee having a similar disability).

434. See Farha v. Cogent Healthcare of Mich., P.C., 164 F. Supp. 3d 974, 990 (E.D. Mich. Feb.
29, 2016).
435. Id.
436. Sherman v. Cty. of Suffolk, 71 F. Supp. 3d 332, 351-53 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
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instances, help to defeat a motion for summary judgment. 437 For example,
a Wal-Mart employee survived a motion for summary judgment based on
evidence that she was discharged because of absences attributed to her
disability.4 38 Even though Wal-Mart had discharged other employees
without disabilities under the same policy, it had failed to provide the
plaintiff, known to have a disability because of earlier requests for
accommodation, with an opportunity to explain her absences as it had for
those other employees. 43 9 That court ultimately denied summary
judgment because a jury could conclude that the employee was not
provided with her routine attendance review meeting because her
employer knew that her disability caused her absences and that
authorization of those absences could be a reasonable accommodation for
her.440
Proof of more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees or
an employer's failure to follow its own procedures may be a path for
avoiding summary judgment for other types of discrimination. 44 1
However, for a person with a disability, this proof of pretext requires a
comparison between that employee's unique circumstances, as influenced
by her disability, and other able-bodied employees who likely have not
requested an accommodation or otherwise faced the barriers to job
performance faced by employees with disabilities. 442 This difficulty may
explain why, in our review of claims by employees with disabilities, most
of them avoided summary judgment only if they were able to provide
evidence of negative, disability-related statements made in close temporal
proximity or otherwise in connection with the adverse action they were

challenging.

437. Feringa v. Andrews, No. 3:19-CV-656, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96425, at *27-29 (N.D.N.Y.
May 20, 2021).
438. Id. at *22-23.
439. Id. at *23; see also Smith v. N. Shore-Long Island Jewish Health Sys., 286 F. Supp. 3d 501,
522 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (denying motion for summary judgment where employer denied leave
connected to disability for administrative reasons that were "either a post hoc fabrication or otherwise
did not actually motivate the employment action.").

440. Feringa,2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96425, at *28-29; see also Conn v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross,
149 F. Supp. 3d 136, 145-46 (D.D.C. 2016) (denying motion for summary judgment where plaintiff
establishes that other employees engaged in similar behavior and were not disciplined as harshly).

441. See Farha v. Cogent Healthcare of Mich., P.C., 164 F. Supp. 3d 974, 990 (E.D. Mich. Feb.
29, 2016); Feringa,2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96425, at *27-29.
442. See Conn, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 145-46.
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CONCLUSION

Research and our own survey establish that people who reveal their
disability to their employer face bias, stigmatization, and stereotypes that
will influence that employer's decisions about them after they reveal a
disability or request an accommodation. 44 3 Both disparate treatment and
retaliation are all possible outcomes of the revelation of a disability during
one's employment.444 The ADA was adopted to guard against those types
of reactions. 445 But as was true twenty years ago regarding employment
discrimination more generally, "[t]he features of accountability,
reflection, and effectiveness that link process to outcomes have sometimes
dropped out of judicial analysis" when addressing second generation
biases. 446 As our overview of decisions applying the ADA to disparate
treatment and retaliation shows, plaintiffs will lose in second generation
cases without "clear evidence of intentional bias."447
One way to avoid these biases would be to expand the protections
against revealing a disability in a post-offer medical examination, or
otherwise prohibiting inquiries about employees' disabilities. However,
employers will be even more reluctant to provide accommodations for
applicants and employees who fail to justify their need for
accommodation without revealing the details of their medical diagnosis.
As long as revelation of one's disability remains part of the
accommodation process, an employee may never feel comfortable in
revealing their need for an accommodation, and "the anti-discrimination
goals of ADA will not be realized." 4 48
If an employee is required to reveal their disability to realize the
ADA's promise of reasonable accommodation, 449 then employers must
be required to address the influence of biases among their own decision
makers. To do so, employers should adopt practices to reduce the
subjectivity in their decision-making, including establishment of "fair
systems and mechanisms of accountability."4 50 To address second
generation discrimination, employers' processes should address the
structural problems underlying second generation bias. To adopt

443.
444.
445.
446.

Hickox & Case, supra note 32, at 550.
See Sturm, supranote 8, at 466-67.
See supra Part H.
See generally Sturm, supra note 8, at 542.

447. Id. at 554.
448. See Porter, supra note 11, at 852.

449.

Id at

450.

Sturm, supra note 8, at 489.

851-52.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol39/iss1/2

60

Hickox and Stevelinck: Denial of Jury Trials for Employees with Disabilities: The High B

2021 ]

HIGHBAR OFPROVING DISCRIMINATORY INTENT

61

processes that address "problems of both productivity and inclusion," 451
employers should ensure that qualifications for a position and the scope
of a direct threat analysis are not so broad as to exclude people with
disabilities from their workforce. 4 52 Moreover, adverse actions proposed
after an employee reveals a disability or requests an accommodation
should be examined carefully to ensure that biases have not influenced
that proposition.
If employers are unwilling or unable to adopt practices to address the
influence of biases against people with disabilities, then courts must
enhance their enforcement of the ADA's protections to reduce the
influence of those biases. First, courts should reconsider their application
of the honest belief defense under the ADA.4 53 This defense allows
employers to manufacture justifications for an adverse action taken
against an employee with a disability simply by claiming that the
employer believed, even mistakenly, that the employee was unable to
perform their job duties or posed a direct threat because of their
disability.4 54 This defense allows employers to rely on their biases and
stereotypes about people with disabilities to justify an adverse action
without even facing a jury's review. 45 5 Instead, untruthful or inaccurate
justifications for an adverse action against an employee with a disability
should not prevent that plaintiff from presenting all of her evidence of bias
to a jury to determine the factual issue of whether her employer acted with
discriminatory intent.
Second, in both disparate treatment and retaliation claims, courts
should allow a jury to decide whether negative disability-related
statements made by an employer's representatives establish that
employer's discriminatory or retaliatory intent, even if the employer does
not acknowledge that the employee has a disability as defined by the
ADA.45 6 Moreover, a jury should decide whether statements made by any
employer's representative reflects the influence of disability-related
biases on an adverse action decision, even if that particular statement was
not made by the employer's official "decision maker." 4 57 Such statements
could reflect a culture where negative stereotypes indirectly influence

451. See id. at 489-90.
452. See generally id. at 489-520 (discussing examples from studies on the workplace).
453. See generally supra Part HI.D (discussing the honest belief defense).

454. See, e.g., Kolesnikow v. Hudson Valley Hosp. Ctr., 622 F. Supp. 2d 98, 111 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
455. See id. at 106-07.
456.
457.

See supra Part I.E.1.
See supraPart II.E.1.
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decisions. In addition, a jury could decide the relevance of such negative
statements even if made some time prior to the final decision to take an
adverse action against a person with a disability, because a person's
disability and their need for accommodation is a continuous state of
being.4 58
Third, a jury should decide whether discriminatory or retaliatory
intent influenced an adverse action taken even after a significant period of
time has passed since the person's initial revelation of a disability or
request for accommodation. 459 Unlike other categories of employees
protected against discrimination, employees with disabilities who seek
accommodations should be afforded with a continuing assumption that an
adverse action is tied to their request for an accommodation. This
assumption is appropriate because accommodation is a continuous event
rather than a singular event like revealing one's religion or engaging in
some other type of protected activity, such as filing an EEOC charge. 460
Employees with disabilities who cannot prove that disability-related
statements were made should not be required to prove that their employer
treated a similarly situated employee differently to survive a motion for
summary judgment. 4 6 1 Typically, an employee with a disability faces
unique challenges or limitations in performing work duties, which is why
the ADA provides for reasonable accommodation. 462 To require that an
employee compare herself to a co-worker with similar limitations, who
likely does not exist, essentially nullifies this method of proving
pretext. 463
Lastly, courts need to ensure that employers adopt a system of
accountability to ensure that bias does not negatively influence decisions
about and treatment of people with disabilities. Professor Susan Sturm
points out that such accountability needs to "(a) provide for regular
assessment of the adequacy of processes and outcomes, (b) redefine
compliance to reward effective problem solving, and (c) sanction stasis in
the face of identified and uncorrected problems or extreme, first
generation violations."464 If employers are unwilling or unable to selfpolice to address the impact of biases against people with disabilities, then
courts should "encourage employers to design systems that will bring

458.
459.
460.
461.
462.

See supraPart i.E.1.
See supraPart .C., l.E.2.
See supraPart H.C.
See supraPart l.E.3.
See Hickox & Case, supranote 32, at 567.

463.

See supraPart H.E.3.

464.

Sturm, supra note 8, at 555.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol39/iss1/2

62

Hickox and Stevelinck: Denial of Jury Trials for Employees with Disabilities: The High B

HIGHBAR OF PROVING DISCRIMINATORYINTENT

2021 ]

63

problems to the surface, to develop and continually reassess measures of
effectiveness, to reflect on patterns that cut across individual cases, or to
undertake more structural approaches" to provide stronger protections
against disparate treatment, harassment and retaliation. 465 Employers'
processes should be required to include "robust criteria and measures of
effectiveness in relation to the problems of bias." 466
Lack of employment opportunities is a serious issue for people with
disabilities, especially those disabilities which carry a heavy, negative
stigma.46 7 Even if that disability is hidden, applicants and employees may
need to reveal that disability to obtain the accommodations they need to
be productive, to which they are entitled under the ADA. 468 That
revelation can lead to disparate treatment, harassment, and retaliation by
employers whose decision makers hold biases related to those
disabilities. 469
To address that anticipated mistreatment, both employers and courts
should adopt protections for people with disabilities that include the
ability to challenge decisions and treatment which arise from those biases.
This means that an applicant or employee should have an opportunity to
establish discriminatory intent even if the decision maker or harasser does
not use inflammatory language or time their decision in extremely close
proximity to the revelation of a disability.4 70 With additional protections
in place, people with disabilities will have more opportunities to gain
meaningful employment, which will in turn help to address biases in that
organization. 47 1 Only then will the ADA have a chance to achieve its
intended purpose of supporting the entry and retention of people with
disabilities in the workforce. 472

465. Id. at 539.
466. Id. at 559.
467.
468.
469.
470.

See
See
See
See

supraPart
supraPart
supraPart
supraPart

I.A.
I.B.
I.B.

471.

IIA; see also supra Part H.C.
See generally supra Part I.

472.

See supraPart II.
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APPENDIX B

Survey Questions
Below are the questions asked in the survey conducted by the authors.
The results of this survey remain unpublished; however, they are
analyzed and summarized in this article. The results are on file with both
the author and the Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal.
Q1: Are you an employee, student, or both?
Q2: How would you classify your disability (check all that apply)?

Q3: Do you receive any accommodations in your workplace?
Q4: Who did you first contact to receive an accommodation (selected
choice)?

Q5: Who else did you meet to discuss your needs for accommodation(s)
during the process (selected choice)?
Q6: Did you need and/or receive assistance to complete the
accommodation request (selected choice)?

Q7: Did any of the following factors add to the time from when you
requested an accommodation to the time you received the
accommodation(s) (Check all that apply)?
Q8: How would you characterize the process of requesting
accommodations?
Easy
Somewhat easy
No Strong Opinion
Somewhat Difficult

Difficult

Q9: I was satisfied with the results of the accommodation request
process.
Strongly Agree

Agree

either Agree nor disagree
Disagree
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Strongly Disagree
Q10: My relationship with my supervisor was negatively affected by the
accommodation process.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neither Agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Q11: Stereotypes/stigma related to my disability have negatively
influenced how peers and supervisors treat me.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neither Agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Q12: Disclosing my disability has helped my disability has helped
achieve my goals in work.
Strongly Agree
Nther Agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Q13: Only the necessary information to provide my accommodation was
given to my direct supervisor.
Strongly Agree
Neither Agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree

Q14: I can be honest with my supervisor about my disability and how it
affects me.
Strongly Agree
Agree

Neither Agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
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Q15: I feel in control of the accommodation process and how it affects
me.
Strongly Agree

A gree

either Agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Q16: I had access to information about receiving accommodations early
on in my employment.
Strongly Agree

Agree

eitherAgree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Q17: Would you be interested in participating in a follow up 20-30minute interview?
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